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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A ignations occurred, and a lack of spare parts plagued early efforts. In November, Chennault reported that only 43 of the original IOO planes were serviceable and that only 84 pilots remained fit for combat duty." Some of the most critically needed equipment was sent by air, but interested parties in the United States met with little success in an attempt to procure additional recruits. Chennault would have to do with what he had. O n the eve of war, the Air Staff had under consideration a proposal to reinforce the Chinese defenses of Kun- ming with Philippine-based planes of the AAF in the event of an an- ticipated attack on this terminal of the Burma Road.13 A cardinal feature of Chennault's plan was to avoid commitment of his force until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had been instructed to lend every assistance against possible pressure for a premature commitment.l* But after 7 December 1941,Rangoon, chief port of entry in Burma for supplies reaching China over the Burma Road, came under the threat of Japanese attack; and in response to a British appeal, one squadron of the A V G was sent to Mingaladon on 1 2 December. During the following week, the other two squadrons were moved east to Kunming for protection of the cities of southwest China and for patrol of the Burma Road, now subject to attack from near-by fields in Thailand. There, the AVG pilots first entered combat when, on 2 0 December, they inflicted heavy loss on Japanese bombers attempt- ing an attack on Kunming. Three days later, the P-4oB's at Min- galadon inflicted comparable damage on a formation of enemy planes attacking R a n g o ~ n . ' ~ As the battle for Burma became increasingly bitter, Chennault adopted a policy of rotating assignments that would give each squad- ron brief periods of comparative relaxation at Kunming, where com- bat missions were somewhat less frequent and exhausting. H e resisted pressure to commit the entire A V G to Burma and divided his planes so that in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol of the Burma Road and a measure of support for Chinese ground forces along the Salween River.le T h e policy followed actually represented the piecemeal com- mitment he had planned to avoid; but it enabled him to assist in holding the port of Rangoon until some of the supplies stockpiled there had been moved out for shipment to China, to protect the Burma Road 489
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