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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
C O M M I T M E N T S T O C H I N A
pines and more recently of American air units operating in the
Netherlands East Indies, he was now to command an air force based
in India with a mission for the support of China. Key decisions would
involve consideration of the interests, not always identical, of two
major allies. Once again he had to improvise an organization in the
face of a rapidly advancing enemy whose conquest of Burma, which
held the key to any plan for the immediate assistance of China, would
be completed before the Tenth could be given the means to fight.
Lacking personnel, planes, and other equipment that make up an air
force, Brereton would not even command the major American air unit
operating within the theater. For ere the famed American Volunteer
Group ( A V G ) had been inducted into the AAF in July, General
Brereton was transferred, with such striking force as the Tenth
possessed, to the Middle East.
The AVG
T h e exigency of war had determined the time and circumstances of
General Brereton’s arrival in India, but the decision to conduct aerial
operations in support of China came as a logical culmination of a well-
defined American policy extending back to the Japanese occupation
of Manchuria in 193 I . At that time the American people had been un-
prepared to go beyond a general indorsement of the policy of non-
recognition for such conquests enunciated by Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State, who was now serving as the Secretary of War. But
we had watched with growing concern the progress of Japanese
forces in China, and with increasing admiration the evident purpose
of the Chinese to continue their resistance. This concern had become
acute by 1941, when all approaches to China had been sealed off ex-
cept for the Burma Road, a tortuous truck route hewed through the
mountains between Lashio and Kunming in 1937-38.2
A quickened interest displayed in the Sino-Japanese conflict by the
American government in I 94 I reflected not merely a growing popular
demand, in which the traditionally isolationist section of the press
tended to join, but the government’s own concern over the prospect
of an early involvement in war with both Germany and Japan. If
we were to fight both of them (and the two had entered recently
into a formal alliance clearly directed against the United States) , the
most realistic of considerations argued for every possible effort to
strengthen China, especially in view of strategic plans then taking
48s

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