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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
reply of a pilot lieutenant: “It has been discussed everywhere I have
been where there are any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against it.” * There were a few
iconoclasts in the Navy who supported the move for reorganization in
some particulars-not in all. There were, too, enthusiastic advocates of
the separate air force in Congress, and eventually a large public fol-
lowing was built up. Early incumbents of the Office of Chief of the
Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership devolved upon General Mitchell,
assistant chief from 1 9 1 9 to 1925, whose energetic and sometimes
flamboyant figure dominated the postwar struggle as it had the com-
bat effort in France.
The alignment was hardly an even one. Mitchell and his followers
had enthusiasm, but their opponents had rank. Because the far-reaching
and permanent changes sought by the Air Service demanded legisla-
tive sanction, much of the struggle was aired publicly. In 1928 Maj.
Gen. Mason M. Patrick, recently retired Chief of the Air Corps, wrote
somewhat plaintively that “the Air Service or rather the air effort, of
the United States since we entered the World War has probably been
the most investigated activity ever carried on by the United States.”
The end was not then in sight. Six years later the Baker Board listed
fourteen such investigations (omitting the one most favorably inclined
to the independent air force),” and others were to follow. The mem-
bers of most boards were distinguished enough, but they were named
by those in authority who were opposed to change: from the Menoher
Board of 1919,composed of a nonflying Director of the Air Service
and a group of artillery officers, to the Baker Board of 1934, with its
military membership of four ground officers and one aviator, the in-
vestigating committees from the airman’s point of view were usually
stacked. Whatever may have been the logic of arguments redundantly
cited, he viewed the conclusion, usually conservative in nature, with
deep suspicion: as a disgruntled witness said in one instance, “the find-
ings of the Morrow Board were approved before the Morrow Board
ever assembled.’’ l 1
Filled with a missionary zeal and frustrated by lack of success,
Mitchell and his followers spoke intemperately. Their opponents re-
plied in kind and attempted to still dissident voices by authority rather
than by reason. And so the fight for recognition of air power took on
all the bitterness of domestic strife, with “the feeling on the part of
2 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.