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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
reply of a pilot lieutenant: “It has been discussed everywhere I have
been where there are any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against it.” * There were a few
iconoclasts in the Navy who supported the move for reorganization in
some particulars-not in all. There were, too, enthusiastic advocates of
the separate air force in Congress, and eventually a large public fol-
lowing was built up. Early incumbents of the Office of Chief of the
Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership devolved upon General Mitchell,
assistant chief from 1 9 1 9 to 1925, whose energetic and sometimes
flamboyant figure dominated the postwar struggle as it had the com-
bat effort in France.
The alignment was hardly an even one. Mitchell and his followers
had enthusiasm, but their opponents had rank. Because the far-reaching
and permanent changes sought by the Air Service demanded legisla-
tive sanction, much of the struggle was aired publicly. In 1928 Maj.
Gen. Mason M. Patrick, recently retired Chief of the Air Corps, wrote
somewhat plaintively that “the Air Service or rather the air effort, of
the United States since we entered the World War has probably been
the most investigated activity ever carried on by the United States.”
The end was not then in sight. Six years later the Baker Board listed
fourteen such investigations (omitting the one most favorably inclined
to the independent air force),” and others were to follow. The mem-
bers of most boards were distinguished enough, but they were named
by those in authority who were opposed to change: from the Menoher
Board of 1919,composed of a nonflying Director of the Air Service
and a group of artillery officers, to the Baker Board of 1934, with its
military membership of four ground officers and one aviator, the in-
vestigating committees from the airman’s point of view were usually
stacked. Whatever may have been the logic of arguments redundantly
cited, he viewed the conclusion, usually conservative in nature, with
deep suspicion: as a disgruntled witness said in one instance, “the find-
ings of the Morrow Board were approved before the Morrow Board
ever assembled.’’ l 1
Filled with a missionary zeal and frustrated by lack of success,
Mitchell and his followers spoke intemperately. Their opponents re-
plied in kind and attempted to still dissident voices by authority rather
than by reason. And so the fight for recognition of air power took on
all the bitterness of domestic strife, with “the feeling on the part of
2 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.