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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Virtually all operations were flown from areas that were remote from
the more thickly settled sections of Australia; living conditions were
primitive, the food was chiefly an unfamiliar Australian ration, the
incidence of dengue fever and malaria was high, and facilities for
hospitalization and recreation were more than inadequate.2s In these
circumstances, the strain of unusually difficult operations took a higher
toll. Personnel who had fought through the Philippine and Java
campaigns suffered effects of fatigue that at times approached a
defeatist attitude; even those who had flown their first combat mission
in April had to fight a feeling of disillusionment. Long overwater
flights, the dropping of a few bombs with unobserved results, the
loss of friends to combat and accident, the lack of opportunity for
leave and rotation, the slowness of promotion, and a rather confusing
system of operational control, all added up to a trying experience
that seemed to have little if anything to do with the outcome of the
war. Personal relations with the Australians were generally excellent,
for the two peoples had much in common, but the American flyer
tended to resent the extent of RAAF control and to find in its
administrative forms, as with any unfamiliar government form, a
ready source of grievance.” With the inevitably limited perspective
which modern war imposes upon the individual participant, dependent
upon the leadership of officers who often were as yet young and
inexperienced, and lacking the assistance of effectively organized
informational services, he had trouble in assessing his own part with
reference to the whole or even in recognizing that he and his im-
mediate fellows were beginning to function like a team.
Responsible officers were alert to these and other needs, and some
of them had occasion for satisfaction with the progress made.30
Air Services still suffered because of an insufficient number of trained
personnel and the necessity of resorting to cannibalizing aircraft in
order to get spare parts, but through the agencies of the Australian
government an increasingly effective liaison had been established
between the Allied command and Australian industry. Some parts
and very helpful maintenance facilities were now available from
Australian sources. It was possible to provide a complete overhaul
for all types of American engines. With local assistance in the pro-
vision of materials and tools, the supply and maintenance section of
Air Services, under Col. Carl Connell, was pioneering in the design
and development of a fifty-gallon steel interchangeable belly tank for
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