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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Virtually all operations were flown from areas that were remote from
the more thickly settled sections of Australia; living conditions were
primitive, the food was chiefly an unfamiliar Australian ration, the
incidence of dengue fever and malaria was high, and facilities for
hospitalization and recreation were more than inadequate.2s In these
circumstances, the strain of unusually difficult operations took a higher
toll. Personnel who had fought through the Philippine and Java
campaigns suffered effects of fatigue that at times approached a
defeatist attitude; even those who had flown their first combat mission
in April had to fight a feeling of disillusionment. Long overwater
flights, the dropping of a few bombs with unobserved results, the
loss of friends to combat and accident, the lack of opportunity for
leave and rotation, the slowness of promotion, and a rather confusing
system of operational control, all added up to a trying experience
that seemed to have little if anything to do with the outcome of the
war. Personal relations with the Australians were generally excellent,
for the two peoples had much in common, but the American flyer
tended to resent the extent of RAAF control and to find in its
administrative forms, as with any unfamiliar government form, a
ready source of grievance.” With the inevitably limited perspective
which modern war imposes upon the individual participant, dependent
upon the leadership of officers who often were as yet young and
inexperienced, and lacking the assistance of effectively organized
informational services, he had trouble in assessing his own part with
reference to the whole or even in recognizing that he and his im-
mediate fellows were beginning to function like a team.
Responsible officers were alert to these and other needs, and some
of them had occasion for satisfaction with the progress made.30
Air Services still suffered because of an insufficient number of trained
personnel and the necessity of resorting to cannibalizing aircraft in
order to get spare parts, but through the agencies of the Australian
government an increasingly effective liaison had been established
between the Allied command and Australian industry. Some parts
and very helpful maintenance facilities were now available from
Australian sources. It was possible to provide a complete overhaul
for all types of American engines. With local assistance in the pro-
vision of materials and tools, the supply and maintenance section of
Air Services, under Col. Carl Connell, was pioneering in the design
and development of a fifty-gallon steel interchangeable belly tank for
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.