“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E P R O B L E M O F N E W G U I N E A
at Lae, Salamaua, and Rabaul. Presumably, the best-equipped plane at
the disposal of the Allied Air Forces for this purpose was the A-24,
but its range did not carry to the main routes of enemy shipping at
this time. T h e B- I 7 had the range, but the normal priority assigned to
counterair operations and the special priority given to reconnaissance
left few planes for the purpose. Moreover, pilots trained in high-level
bombardment showed no inclination to experiment with low-level
attacks. In anticipation of an expected need, a detachment of the
L zd Group went through some training with especially equipped
B-26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record was spotty, but there was much to support
General Arnold's contention during the summer and fall that, given
a complete build-up of the assigned forces, the Pacific commands
possessed enough air strength to hold the Certainly, the
Allied Air Forces was holding its own; at no time since April had
the Japanese enjoyed numerical superiority, and this despite depart-
ure of some AAF units to strengthen the South Pacific. From April
to mid-July, American units lost in combat sixty-one fighters and
twenty-two bombers, an additional ten bombers and one fighter on
the ground to enemy action, and the depressing total of fifty-four
fighters and twenty-three bombers to accidents. During the same
period, claims were made for more than eighty Japanese planes shot
down; others were destroyed on the ground, and there is reason to
believe that unrecorded planes were lost as a result of combat damage
on the way back to their bases. It also seems to be a reasonable
assumption that operational losses were high."j A discouraging factor
to American airmen in the Southwest Pacific was the delay in the
arrival of reinforcements and replacements. Here the enemy, with
interior lines of communications, presumably had the advantage. T h e
arrival of American fighters and short-range bombers depended on
the critical item of shipping, and even the bombers arriving by the
ferry route came in more slowly than had been expected. There was
cause for foreboding in figures which showed that during May and
June 106 fighters and 42 bombers had been lost, while gains listed
no fighters and only sixty-two But American production
was now reaching a point that soon would permit it to provide the
remedy.
Another cause for concern was the unsatisfactory state of morale.
48 1