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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E P R O B L E M O F N E W G U I N E A
Between 24 April and 4 July, seventy B-25 sorties were flown
against Lae and Salamaua, to which number there were added eighty-
four B-26 sorties, forty-five by B - I ~ ’ s ,and twenty by RAAF Cata-
linas, Beauforts, and Hudsons. Insofar as was possible, the bombing
efforts of the several units were co-ordinated, as when, on 16 May,
fourteen B - 2 5 ’ ~and four B-26’s destroyed buildings, set fire to fuel
dumps, and damaged grounded aircraft at Lae. On 9 June, five B-25’s,
eleven B-26’s, and two B-17’s bombed the same target through an
overcast; and on 16 June, nine B-25’~,ten B-26’~,and three B-17’s
scored hits on runways and buildings. It was difficult to ascertain
the damage done. The weather was frequently unfavorable, and the
Japanese skillful at camouflage. Photographic reconnaissance indicated
that bombs often fell wide of the target, and the enemy continued
to add new taxiways and dispersal areas. But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either Lae
or Salamaua, and that was what counted. Indeed, Allied estimates,
based in part on information supplied by an RAAF officer who spent
months within sighting distance of Lae, indicated that enemy fighters
based on New Guinea rarely numbered more than forty.l9 These
were enough, however, to maintain a stubborn defense. Between 24
April and 4 July, three B-26’s and eleven B-25’s were lost in combat.
Especially heavy were the losses to an interception of 24 May. Eight
B-25’s of the 13th Squadron led by its commander, Capt. Herman F.
Lowery, and flying as usual without escort, cut through a pass in
the mountains, swept wide of Salamaua, and turned in toward Lae
from the east to be met head-on by a strong force of enemy fighters.
Six or seven of them were shot down, but Captain Lowery’s plane
burst into flames and dove into the ocean, and one by one four other
B-25’~went down. A sixth bomber crash-landed on its return to
Moresby.‘O As with the heavy bombers, Moresby served the mediums
only as a staging point.
More of the B-26’s would have been available for strikes at Lae
and Salamaua had it not been for the fact that during April and May
the 22d Group assumed a major responsibility for the run to Rabaul.
This, of course, was a job for the heavies, but on z April the 19th
Group had but six aircraft in commission, and through May and June
would average no more than seventeen B-17’s ready for combat, or
less than half its assigned strength. Moreover, one of its four squad-
rons, the 435th’ was reserved for reconnaissance duties, and repeatedly
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