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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E P R O B L E M O F N E W G U I N E A
Between 24 April and 4 July, seventy B-25 sorties were flown
against Lae and Salamaua, to which number there were added eighty-
four B-26 sorties, forty-five by B - I ~ ’ s ,and twenty by RAAF Cata-
linas, Beauforts, and Hudsons. Insofar as was possible, the bombing
efforts of the several units were co-ordinated, as when, on 16 May,
fourteen B - 2 5 ’ ~and four B-26’s destroyed buildings, set fire to fuel
dumps, and damaged grounded aircraft at Lae. On 9 June, five B-25’s,
eleven B-26’s, and two B-17’s bombed the same target through an
overcast; and on 16 June, nine B-25’~,ten B-26’~,and three B-17’s
scored hits on runways and buildings. It was difficult to ascertain
the damage done. The weather was frequently unfavorable, and the
Japanese skillful at camouflage. Photographic reconnaissance indicated
that bombs often fell wide of the target, and the enemy continued
to add new taxiways and dispersal areas. But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either Lae
or Salamaua, and that was what counted. Indeed, Allied estimates,
based in part on information supplied by an RAAF officer who spent
months within sighting distance of Lae, indicated that enemy fighters
based on New Guinea rarely numbered more than forty.l9 These
were enough, however, to maintain a stubborn defense. Between 24
April and 4 July, three B-26’s and eleven B-25’s were lost in combat.
Especially heavy were the losses to an interception of 24 May. Eight
B-25’s of the 13th Squadron led by its commander, Capt. Herman F.
Lowery, and flying as usual without escort, cut through a pass in
the mountains, swept wide of Salamaua, and turned in toward Lae
from the east to be met head-on by a strong force of enemy fighters.
Six or seven of them were shot down, but Captain Lowery’s plane
burst into flames and dove into the ocean, and one by one four other
B-25’~went down. A sixth bomber crash-landed on its return to
Moresby.‘O As with the heavy bombers, Moresby served the mediums
only as a staging point.
More of the B-26’s would have been available for strikes at Lae
and Salamaua had it not been for the fact that during April and May
the 22d Group assumed a major responsibility for the run to Rabaul.
This, of course, was a job for the heavies, but on z April the 19th
Group had but six aircraft in commission, and through May and June
would average no more than seventeen B-17’s ready for combat, or
less than half its assigned strength. Moreover, one of its four squad-
rons, the 435th’ was reserved for reconnaissance duties, and repeatedly
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