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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the rate of about three tons of cargo a week. Since this force repre-
sented the only ground unit, aside from guerrillas, actually engaged
in fighting the enemy, it was decided to supplement its supplies and
to provide reinforcements by air transport with a view toward launch-
ing an attack against Lae and Salamaua. This project was somewhat
delayed by bad weather and inability to provide fighter cover, but
on 2 2 May a flight by the 2 1st Troop Carrier Squadron inaugurated
a movement of about 300 troops and supplies. For more than a year
thereafter, the rough and sloping 3,300-foot runway at Wau served
as the most advanced terminal of Southwest Pacific transport opera-
tions. At the close of June, the small force at Wau even undertook
raids on the Japanese positions a t Lae and Salamaua.16
Efforts to make Lae and Salamaua as untenable for enemy bombers
as was Port Moresby for Allied bombers had been inaugurated by
the A-24’s of the 8th Squadron a t the opening of April. But prior
to their withdrawal at the end of May to Charters Towers, the A-24’s
flew only four combat missions, totaling twenty-nine sorties, from
Port Moresby. Though only two were lost in combat as against
claims of six enemy planes destroyed on the ground and two shot
down, operational losses were high. On 4 April, of the forty-two
dive bombers assigned to the Allied Air Forces, only twenty-two were
in commission; two months later, only twelve out of twenty-six.17
Designed originally as a carrier-borne plane and seemingly unequal
to the rough wear of imperfect fields, of relatively short range and
slow speed, and highly vulnerable except when provided with better
escort than was possible at Port Moresby, the A-24 was written off
by AAF personnel as unsuited to the type of operations required in
New Guinea, perhaps mistakenly in view of its subsequent record in
Navy hands.
Not unnaturally, the AAF came to place greater confidence in the
more rugged B-25. The early “C” model of the Mitchell Army
bomber had approximately three times the range of an A-24, could
carry more than twice its bomb load, had two more .50-cal. machine
guns, and was faster. Ever popular with Army flyers and locally
dubbed a “luxury liner,” it proved well suited to the hazardous
flights across the Owen Stanley Mountains. The only trouble was
that there were not enough B-25’s. Only fourteen originally had
been available under the Dutch contract, and by August there were
still only seventeen on hand.I8
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