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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
obvious advantages in the reinforcement of his outlying bases, but
even leaving out of account the limited strength of the RAAF, the
Allies no longer faced overwhelming odds in the defense of their
outposts.
The lack of adequate air warning facilities still proved a discourag-
ing factor. RAAF radar equipment, having only a fifty- to seventy-
five-mile range, was quite unsatisfactory, and five sCR-270’~which
had been emplaced in Australia were the only American sets available
at the end of April. As a consequence, a considerable reliance had to
be placed upon spotters in the hills and coast watchers-Australians,
for the most part, who risked their lives in the remote areas of New
Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons to watch and send by radio
a warning of enemy activity-who would render such distinguished
service throughout the Solomon and New Guinea campaigns.l0
Progress had been made in the development of tactical skills, which
helped to overcome the disadvantages of inadequate warning and
certain superior qualities of the enemy planes. The 49th Fighter
Group in its defense of Darwin had compiled a very creditable record.
Prior to May it had lost seven of its P-40’s and three pilots while
destroying an estimated total of 38 Japanese planes and 1 3 5 crewmen.
The heaviest enemy attack had been executed by twenty-four
bombers escorted by nine fighters, and this attack had been met by
fifty P-40’s whose pilots claimed eleven of the enemy aircraft. During
May, Darwin, for a change, remained free of bombing. The enemy
returned on four consecutive days in June, his largest mission com-
prising twenty-seven bombers and eighteen fighters which were inter-
cepted by twenty-eight P-~o’s,and the final score for the month
stood at nine P-40’s against thirteen enemy losses.11 Though the Japa-
nese still could get through to Darwin, it was costly.
A substantial part of the credit must be assigned to the skill of
ground crews and other service personnel. By dint of their energetic
efforts Col. Paul B. Wurtsmith, commanding officer of the 49th
Group, could usually count on having sixty p-40’~in commission,
with the result that his pilots were rarely outnumbered. Probably of
greater significance were the conferences held after every engage-
ment for the purpose of perfecting combat techniques that would
overcome the inferior “speed, maneuverability, climb, and ceiling”
of the P-40. As a result the two-plane element had been fixed upon
as the chief reliance in combat, individual dogfighting had been out-
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