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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
obvious advantages in the reinforcement of his outlying bases, but
even leaving out of account the limited strength of the RAAF, the
Allies no longer faced overwhelming odds in the defense of their
outposts.
The lack of adequate air warning facilities still proved a discourag-
ing factor. RAAF radar equipment, having only a fifty- to seventy-
five-mile range, was quite unsatisfactory, and five sCR-270’~which
had been emplaced in Australia were the only American sets available
at the end of April. As a consequence, a considerable reliance had to
be placed upon spotters in the hills and coast watchers-Australians,
for the most part, who risked their lives in the remote areas of New
Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons to watch and send by radio
a warning of enemy activity-who would render such distinguished
service throughout the Solomon and New Guinea campaigns.l0
Progress had been made in the development of tactical skills, which
helped to overcome the disadvantages of inadequate warning and
certain superior qualities of the enemy planes. The 49th Fighter
Group in its defense of Darwin had compiled a very creditable record.
Prior to May it had lost seven of its P-40’s and three pilots while
destroying an estimated total of 38 Japanese planes and 1 3 5 crewmen.
The heaviest enemy attack had been executed by twenty-four
bombers escorted by nine fighters, and this attack had been met by
fifty P-40’s whose pilots claimed eleven of the enemy aircraft. During
May, Darwin, for a change, remained free of bombing. The enemy
returned on four consecutive days in June, his largest mission com-
prising twenty-seven bombers and eighteen fighters which were inter-
cepted by twenty-eight P-~o’s,and the final score for the month
stood at nine P-40’s against thirteen enemy losses.11 Though the Japa-
nese still could get through to Darwin, it was costly.
A substantial part of the credit must be assigned to the skill of
ground crews and other service personnel. By dint of their energetic
efforts Col. Paul B. Wurtsmith, commanding officer of the 49th
Group, could usually count on having sixty p-40’~in commission,
with the result that his pilots were rarely outnumbered. Probably of
greater significance were the conferences held after every engage-
ment for the purpose of perfecting combat techniques that would
overcome the inferior “speed, maneuverability, climb, and ceiling”
of the P-40. As a result the two-plane element had been fixed upon
as the chief reliance in combat, individual dogfighting had been out-
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