“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E P R O B L E M O F N E W G U I N E A
of both land-based and carrier-borne planes.s It was an ambitious
proposal, indeed too ambitious for the means then a t hand, but it
indicated a line of thought in the War Department that on broad
principle would be favorable to General MacArthur's immediate
proposal and to the development of tactics he would subsequently
follow in the Southwest Pacific.
But the Navy, apparently concerned over the prospect of com-
mitting its forces between New Guinea and the Solomons while the
enemy held the latter, objected to MacArthur's proposal that the
New Britain area should be an immediate objective. It had proposed,
rather, an initial conquest of Tulagi by South Pacific forces supported
by those of the Southwest Pacific.' The introduction of this alterna-
tive into the discussion posed, among other difficulties, a knotty
problem of command; for Tulagi under the original directive to
MacArthur fell within the Southwest Pacific, and it was evident
that the Navy anticipated that, even so, it might control an operation
to be mounted in the South Pacific against the Solomons. Such a
command arrangement, in fact, had become formally a part of the
Navy plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint
Chiefs a proposal that Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, who had
been in command of the South Pacific since 19 June, should be
given command of an operation for seizure of Santa Cruz and Tulagi
on the understanding that General MacArthur would assume control
of its subsequent development into an attack on the Japanese position
in New Guinea and New Britain.6
Though MacArthur had protested that his own plan for direct
action against Rabaul presupposed the establishment of an air su-
premacy that would remove the grounds of the Navy's objection, and
though he warned against the dangers of divided command, Admiral
King's proposal offered the basis of a workable compromise.' Ac-
cordingly, on 2 July the Joint Chiefs issued a directive which defined
their policy with reference to the Japanese threat in terms of three
tasks.' Task one, the occupation of Santa Cruz and Tulagi, would
be executed under the command of Admiral Ghormley with such
support from air and naval units of the Southwest Pacific as could
be rendered. T o remove jurisdictional uncertainties which might
hamper the effort, the boundary between the South and Southwest
Pacific theaters would be moved westward as of I August to the
159th meridian, a line that would place within the South Pacific all
473