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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 a variety of conflicting views. The claims of the Pacific war as against those of the European war inevitably were involved, and tended to find expression in differing views of the Navy and the Army. To the latter, it was of vital importance to avoid commit- ments extending beyond actual requirements for the defensive strategy agreed upon for the Pacific, a view wholeheartedly shared by leaders of the Army Air Forces, who looked forward to the mounting of an early air offensive against Germany. General MacArthur’s position as the responsible commander of the Southwest Pacific led him to form opinions that were held in common with similarly responsible naval commanders who faced the Japanese across the broad reaches of the Pacific Ocean,’ but the division of command between the Army and Navy in the Pacific naturally made for differences of viewpoint. A final settlement of all of the issues involved could not be reached a t this time, but a working agreement on immediate action was achieved, an agreement, moreover, which left the way clear for an early offensive against Germany. Plans for Limited Offensive Action General MacArthur now had in his command two American in- fantry divisions, the 32d and the 41st, which together with the veteran Australian 7th Division provided the nucleus of a ground army, though there were serious deficiences of training and equipment. At the same time, he keenly felt the need for additional naval forces, including two carriers, and of another infantry division especially trained for amphibious assault; for he proposed to undertake a north- ward thrust from Australia by way of New Guinea against the enemy at Rabaul.” His ideas were not without support in Washington, where, for example, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Col. Orvil A. Anderson, had in preparation a study of the possibility of a conquest of Rabaul through operations based upon the principle of a progres- sive achievement of air superiority over intervening land bases. A considerable development of air facilities in northeastern Australia and around Port Moresby, together with control of the air in those areas, initially would be required. Then, with “complete air su- premacy” established over the approaches to New Britain, it would be possible to seize Lae, Salamaua, and Gasmata by an airborne task force, and thus to move forward Allied fighters and dive bombers in preparation for an amphibious assault on Rabaul with the co-operation 472
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