The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
a variety of conflicting views. The claims of the Pacific war as
against those of the European war inevitably were involved, and
tended to find expression in differing views of the Navy and the
Army. To the latter, it was of vital importance to avoid commit-
ments extending beyond actual requirements for the defensive strategy
agreed upon for the Pacific, a view wholeheartedly shared by leaders
of the Army Air Forces, who looked forward to the mounting of an
early air offensive against Germany. General MacArthur’s position
as the responsible commander of the Southwest Pacific led him to
form opinions that were held in common with similarly responsible
naval commanders who faced the Japanese across the broad reaches
of the Pacific Ocean,’ but the division of command between the
Army and Navy in the Pacific naturally made for differences of
viewpoint. A final settlement of all of the issues involved could not
be reached a t this time, but a working agreement on immediate action
was achieved, an agreement, moreover, which left the way clear for
an early offensive against Germany.
Plans for Limited Offensive Action
General MacArthur now had in his command two American in-
fantry divisions, the 32d and the 41st, which together with the
veteran Australian 7th Division provided the nucleus of a ground
army, though there were serious deficiences of training and equipment.
At the same time, he keenly felt the need for additional naval forces,
including two carriers, and of another infantry division especially
trained for amphibious assault; for he proposed to undertake a north-
ward thrust from Australia by way of New Guinea against the enemy
at Rabaul.” His ideas were not without support in Washington, where,
for example, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Col. Orvil A.
Anderson, had in preparation a study of the possibility of a conquest
of Rabaul through operations based upon the principle of a progres-
sive achievement of air superiority over intervening land bases. A
considerable development of air facilities in northeastern Australia
and around Port Moresby, together with control of the air in those
areas, initially would be required. Then, with “complete air su-
premacy” established over the approaches to New Britain, it would
be possible to seize Lae, Salamaua, and Gasmata by an airborne task
force, and thus to move forward Allied fighters and dive bombers in
preparation for an amphibious assault on Rabaul with the co-operation
472