Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
C H A P T E R 13
* * * * * * * * * * *
T H E PROBLEM OF
NEW GUINEA
HOUGH apprehension for the security of Australia had been
considerably relieved by Japan’s withdrawal after the Coral
T Sea engagement, and though the offensive strength of theJapanese fleet had been seriously crippled at Midway, enemy forces
still posed a serious threat to the Allied position in Australia and espe-
cially to the line of communications which joined it to the United
States. Even in the absence of carrier strength, it would be possible
for the enemy to move from Rabaul down the Solomons under cover
of land-based aviation and thus to challenge the Allies for posses-
sion of New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the Fijis. Already, in
early May, he had occupied Tulagi on Florida Island, seat of the
British Resident Commissioner of the Solomons; and early in June,
Japanese troops moved across from Tulagi to the Lunga Plain of
Guadalcanal, where they would begin construction of an airfield
destined to fame in American military annals as Henderson Field.
At the same time, he held Lae and Salamaua on the Huon Gulf, and
from there it was a relatively short jump to points on the Papuan
coast, whence, as events would soon prove, he might even attempt the
seizure of Port Moresby by a land attack. T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had suffered no reverse.
Moreover, the successful termination in May of the Japanese in-
vasions of Burma and the Philippines obviously would release addi-
tional forces for the enemy’s use. It was evident that some limited
offensive action by the Allies would be required in order to make
secure the defenses of the South and Southwest Pacific.
There could be no disagreement on the necessity for such action,
but in the discussion of measures to be taken there naturally developed
47 I

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.