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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
C H A P T E R 13 * * * * * * * * * * * T H E PROBLEM OF NEW GUINEA HOUGH apprehension for the security of Australia had been considerably relieved by Japan’s withdrawal after the Coral T Sea engagement, and though the offensive strength of theJapanese fleet had been seriously crippled at Midway, enemy forces still posed a serious threat to the Allied position in Australia and espe- cially to the line of communications which joined it to the United States. Even in the absence of carrier strength, it would be possible for the enemy to move from Rabaul down the Solomons under cover of land-based aviation and thus to challenge the Allies for posses- sion of New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the Fijis. Already, in early May, he had occupied Tulagi on Florida Island, seat of the British Resident Commissioner of the Solomons; and early in June, Japanese troops moved across from Tulagi to the Lunga Plain of Guadalcanal, where they would begin construction of an airfield destined to fame in American military annals as Henderson Field. At the same time, he held Lae and Salamaua on the Huon Gulf, and from there it was a relatively short jump to points on the Papuan coast, whence, as events would soon prove, he might even attempt the seizure of Port Moresby by a land attack. T h e Japanese navy had sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had suffered no reverse. Moreover, the successful termination in May of the Japanese in- vasions of Burma and the Philippines obviously would release addi- tional forces for the enemy’s use. It was evident that some limited offensive action by the Allies would be required in order to make secure the defenses of the South and Southwest Pacific. There could be no disagreement on the necessity for such action, but in the discussion of measures to be taken there naturally developed 47 I
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