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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 28 …PARNAMIRIMFIELD,NATAL,BRAZIL,JUNE1942 . . . BLUIE WEST I , JUNE 1942 . . . . . . . . . . REYKJAVIKAIRFIELD,ICELAND,APRILI 942 . . . . . . THENIGHTSHIFT,PATTERSONFIELD,ICELAND…
  • p. 157 …Brazil offered a likely avenue of approach. Natal, a focal point for established trans-Atlantic air…
  • p. 371 …Pivoting at Natal, it had to traverse an additional 6,000 miles in order to reach…
  • p. 375 …Panair do Brasil, a Pan American subsidiary, had undertaken at Belem and Natal the development with…
  • p. 376 …From Belem, the ten transports proceeded to Natal and thence across the Atlantic to Bathurst. All…
  • p. 378 …Miami-San Juan (Puerto Rico) -Port of Spain (Trinidad) - Belem-Natal-Fisherman’s Lake (Liberia) -Lagos…
  • p. 384 ATKINSON FIELD, BRITISH GUIANA, JUNE 1942 PARNAMIRIM FIELD, NATAL, BRAZIL, JUNE 1942
  • p. 385 …The two bases a t Belem and Natal, built with airport development program funds by the…
  • p. 386 …The most feasible route was determined to be from Natal to Ascension Island to Pointe Noire…
  • p. 388 …Tampa-Trinidad- Belem-Natal-Accra-Khartoum-Cairo-Habbaniya-Karachi.At Karachi the LB-3o’s under…
  • p. 413 …In order to avoid piling up a heavy backlog of cargo and passengers at Natal, it…
  • p. 414 …L D W A R I 1 Natal toward the end of June, at which time…
  • p. 854 …78 Narsarssuak, 157, 343, 641 Nassau, 355 Natal, 120, 319, 321-22, 324, 3 2 ~ 3…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
If the Japanese had achieved their objective in the Aleutians, they
had fallen far short a t Midway, where the outcome of the battle cut
deeply into the war potential of the enemy. The air-sea engagement
had been critical and disastrous; its immediate magnitude was con-
cealed from all but a small handful of individuals in the imperial gen-
eral staff and in the two service ministries, while its ultimate effect
could only become apparent as the war progressed.14s Midway had
levied against the Japanese naval establishment a series of deficits
whose cumulative effect was to become increasingly painful as
the Japanese faced heavier commitments in the Solomons and New
Guinea, and which lay beyond the nation's capacity to overcome.
Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them
the hopes of Admiral Yamamoto to bring about a major fleet engage-
ment a t a maximum distance from home waters; henceforth, the fleet
would not roam the western and central Pacific with relative impunity.
Its future operations would be more difficult, and they would be pri-
marily defen~ive.'~'Furthermore, Midway had forced the Japanese
to recognize that the center of gravity now lay in the carrier divisions,
despite the resistance of older officers who clung to the traditional
battleship as the major ~ e a p o n . ~ "But even more important was the
loss of pilots, for the Midway forces had carried the most highly
skilled flying and technical personnel in the Japanese navy. N o w many
of them were gone; perhaps 3 0 per cent of the pilots had been lost
with the estimated 2 5 0 planes destroyed, and almost half the survivors
were sent to staff a fresh Third Fleet. Before their scheduled two-
month training could be completed, Guadalcanal had been invaded
and it was necessary to commit them to Rabaul, where they were con-
sumed in the running sore of the Solomons. Yamamoto now had his
perimeter anchored in the Aleutians, but the attempt to fix its eastern
terminus a t Midway had dealt his naval air forces a keen blow; until
the carrier groups were restored, his navy would be confined to the
range of shore-based planes moving from island to island across the
Pacific.' I s
470

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.