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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 270 …The air warning system consisted of lookouts posted on hills north and south of the field…
  • p. 334 …mile arc along the coast watched from hills or rooftops as the play of guns and…
  • p. 541 …As a consequence, a considerable reliance had to be placed upon spotters in the hills and…
  • p. 771 …Ladd Field, Alaska to Col. E-W. Hill, OCAG 20 Dec. 1941. 28. “Unless Alaska is…
  • p. 812 …see interview with Air Marshal Sir Roderick Hill, 14 Sept. 1944. 213. Giulio Douhet, Command of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
If the Japanese had achieved their objective in the Aleutians, they
had fallen far short a t Midway, where the outcome of the battle cut
deeply into the war potential of the enemy. The air-sea engagement
had been critical and disastrous; its immediate magnitude was con-
cealed from all but a small handful of individuals in the imperial gen-
eral staff and in the two service ministries, while its ultimate effect
could only become apparent as the war progressed.14s Midway had
levied against the Japanese naval establishment a series of deficits
whose cumulative effect was to become increasingly painful as
the Japanese faced heavier commitments in the Solomons and New
Guinea, and which lay beyond the nation's capacity to overcome.
Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them
the hopes of Admiral Yamamoto to bring about a major fleet engage-
ment a t a maximum distance from home waters; henceforth, the fleet
would not roam the western and central Pacific with relative impunity.
Its future operations would be more difficult, and they would be pri-
marily defen~ive.'~'Furthermore, Midway had forced the Japanese
to recognize that the center of gravity now lay in the carrier divisions,
despite the resistance of older officers who clung to the traditional
battleship as the major ~ e a p o n . ~ "But even more important was the
loss of pilots, for the Midway forces had carried the most highly
skilled flying and technical personnel in the Japanese navy. N o w many
of them were gone; perhaps 3 0 per cent of the pilots had been lost
with the estimated 2 5 0 planes destroyed, and almost half the survivors
were sent to staff a fresh Third Fleet. Before their scheduled two-
month training could be completed, Guadalcanal had been invaded
and it was necessary to commit them to Rabaul, where they were con-
sumed in the running sore of the Solomons. Yamamoto now had his
perimeter anchored in the Aleutians, but the attempt to fix its eastern
terminus a t Midway had dealt his naval air forces a keen blow; until
the carrier groups were restored, his navy would be confined to the
range of shore-based planes moving from island to island across the
Pacific.' I s
470

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.