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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
If the Japanese had achieved their objective in the Aleutians, they
had fallen far short a t Midway, where the outcome of the battle cut
deeply into the war potential of the enemy. The air-sea engagement
had been critical and disastrous; its immediate magnitude was con-
cealed from all but a small handful of individuals in the imperial gen-
eral staff and in the two service ministries, while its ultimate effect
could only become apparent as the war progressed.14s Midway had
levied against the Japanese naval establishment a series of deficits
whose cumulative effect was to become increasingly painful as
the Japanese faced heavier commitments in the Solomons and New
Guinea, and which lay beyond the nation's capacity to overcome.
Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them
the hopes of Admiral Yamamoto to bring about a major fleet engage-
ment a t a maximum distance from home waters; henceforth, the fleet
would not roam the western and central Pacific with relative impunity.
Its future operations would be more difficult, and they would be pri-
marily defen~ive.'~'Furthermore, Midway had forced the Japanese
to recognize that the center of gravity now lay in the carrier divisions,
despite the resistance of older officers who clung to the traditional
battleship as the major ~ e a p o n . ~ "But even more important was the
loss of pilots, for the Midway forces had carried the most highly
skilled flying and technical personnel in the Japanese navy. N o w many
of them were gone; perhaps 3 0 per cent of the pilots had been lost
with the estimated 2 5 0 planes destroyed, and almost half the survivors
were sent to staff a fresh Third Fleet. Before their scheduled two-
month training could be completed, Guadalcanal had been invaded
and it was necessary to commit them to Rabaul, where they were con-
sumed in the running sore of the Solomons. Yamamoto now had his
perimeter anchored in the Aleutians, but the attempt to fix its eastern
terminus a t Midway had dealt his naval air forces a keen blow; until
the carrier groups were restored, his navy would be confined to the
range of shore-based planes moving from island to island across the
Pacific.' I s
470

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.