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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
was the Takao, whose gunners shot down Mansfield’s B-17; only one
survivor of the aircrew was recovered by the Japanese.138
The final attempt to attack the task force came when Captain Marks
informed the B-26’s on Umnak of the target’s precise location. Five
B-26’s took off a t 2040 led by Captain Meals, and three aircraft located
the carriers. T w o torpedoes were launched, and it was believed at the
time they had scored a t least one hit on a cruiser. Actually they failed
to hit, and the carrier escaped as well.lS9So ended the Dutch Harbor
episode. For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0 0 barrels of Diesel oil, some destruction from fire, forty-three
dead a t Dutch Harbor (thirty-three of them Army personnel), and
about fifty wounded.14’ For the AAF, it meant the loss of two P-40’s
in action, one B-17 down in combat, one B-26 lost, one damaged by
antiaircraft fire, one wrecked in landing, one LB-30 wrecked at
Kodiak on its return from Elmendorf. Perhaps the most critical loss
was that of radar equipment, for which spare parts were not available
except a t the cost of sets scheduled for delivery to the South Pacific
bases.141The Navy’s patrolling PBY-sA’s had suffered very severe
losses to the Zekes, ko severe that on 4 June, after forty hours of almost
continuous operations in wretched weather, pilots and crews were
at the limit of their endurance and only fourteen planes remained
operative.”*
On the side of the enemy, it is probable that he achieved about all
he had hoped for; losses were light, no damage had been incurred in any
of the attacks, and the way was open for landing on the outer Aleu-
tians. After recovering all surviving planes, the task force retired to
a point about 600 miles south of Kiska where it was joined by the
carrier Zuiho plus the Kongo and the Harum, which had come up
from Midway, and together these forces cruised south of Kiska for
ten days to screen the landing These, including a special
naval landing force of 5 5 0 men and 700 labor troops, had gone ashore
on Kiska on 6 June, but only after some debate on the part of Admiral
Yamamoto, who had seen his carriers destroyed a t Midway on the 4th.
Well aware of the significance of the grievous losses at Midway, ap-
parently he had canceled the entire Aleutian landing operation, then
yielded to his staff, which persuaded him to return to the original
plan, with the result that the Kiska landing proceeded without further
opposition, followed by additional landings on Attu on 7 June.144
469

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