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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
was the Takao, whose gunners shot down Mansfield’s B-17; only one
survivor of the aircrew was recovered by the Japanese.138
The final attempt to attack the task force came when Captain Marks
informed the B-26’s on Umnak of the target’s precise location. Five
B-26’s took off a t 2040 led by Captain Meals, and three aircraft located
the carriers. T w o torpedoes were launched, and it was believed at the
time they had scored a t least one hit on a cruiser. Actually they failed
to hit, and the carrier escaped as well.lS9So ended the Dutch Harbor
episode. For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0 0 barrels of Diesel oil, some destruction from fire, forty-three
dead a t Dutch Harbor (thirty-three of them Army personnel), and
about fifty wounded.14’ For the AAF, it meant the loss of two P-40’s
in action, one B-17 down in combat, one B-26 lost, one damaged by
antiaircraft fire, one wrecked in landing, one LB-30 wrecked at
Kodiak on its return from Elmendorf. Perhaps the most critical loss
was that of radar equipment, for which spare parts were not available
except a t the cost of sets scheduled for delivery to the South Pacific
bases.141The Navy’s patrolling PBY-sA’s had suffered very severe
losses to the Zekes, ko severe that on 4 June, after forty hours of almost
continuous operations in wretched weather, pilots and crews were
at the limit of their endurance and only fourteen planes remained
operative.”*
On the side of the enemy, it is probable that he achieved about all
he had hoped for; losses were light, no damage had been incurred in any
of the attacks, and the way was open for landing on the outer Aleu-
tians. After recovering all surviving planes, the task force retired to
a point about 600 miles south of Kiska where it was joined by the
carrier Zuiho plus the Kongo and the Harum, which had come up
from Midway, and together these forces cruised south of Kiska for
ten days to screen the landing These, including a special
naval landing force of 5 5 0 men and 700 labor troops, had gone ashore
on Kiska on 6 June, but only after some debate on the part of Admiral
Yamamoto, who had seen his carriers destroyed a t Midway on the 4th.
Well aware of the significance of the grievous losses at Midway, ap-
parently he had canceled the entire Aleutian landing operation, then
yielded to his staff, which persuaded him to return to the original
plan, with the result that the Kiska landing proceeded without further
opposition, followed by additional landings on Attu on 7 June.144
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