“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
was the Takao, whose gunners shot down Mansfield’s B-17; only one
survivor of the aircrew was recovered by the Japanese.138
The final attempt to attack the task force came when Captain Marks
informed the B-26’s on Umnak of the target’s precise location. Five
B-26’s took off a t 2040 led by Captain Meals, and three aircraft located
the carriers. T w o torpedoes were launched, and it was believed at the
time they had scored a t least one hit on a cruiser. Actually they failed
to hit, and the carrier escaped as well.lS9So ended the Dutch Harbor
episode. For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0 0 barrels of Diesel oil, some destruction from fire, forty-three
dead a t Dutch Harbor (thirty-three of them Army personnel), and
about fifty wounded.14’ For the AAF, it meant the loss of two P-40’s
in action, one B-17 down in combat, one B-26 lost, one damaged by
antiaircraft fire, one wrecked in landing, one LB-30 wrecked at
Kodiak on its return from Elmendorf. Perhaps the most critical loss
was that of radar equipment, for which spare parts were not available
except a t the cost of sets scheduled for delivery to the South Pacific
bases.141The Navy’s patrolling PBY-sA’s had suffered very severe
losses to the Zekes, ko severe that on 4 June, after forty hours of almost
continuous operations in wretched weather, pilots and crews were
at the limit of their endurance and only fourteen planes remained
operative.”*
On the side of the enemy, it is probable that he achieved about all
he had hoped for; losses were light, no damage had been incurred in any
of the attacks, and the way was open for landing on the outer Aleu-
tians. After recovering all surviving planes, the task force retired to
a point about 600 miles south of Kiska where it was joined by the
carrier Zuiho plus the Kongo and the Harum, which had come up
from Midway, and together these forces cruised south of Kiska for
ten days to screen the landing These, including a special
naval landing force of 5 5 0 men and 700 labor troops, had gone ashore
on Kiska on 6 June, but only after some debate on the part of Admiral
Yamamoto, who had seen his carriers destroyed a t Midway on the 4th.
Well aware of the significance of the grievous losses at Midway, ap-
parently he had canceled the entire Aleutian landing operation, then
yielded to his staff, which persuaded him to return to the original
plan, with the result that the Kiska landing proceeded without further
opposition, followed by additional landings on Attu on 7 June.144
469