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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I f cient numbers of B-17's and B-24's for naval use in long-range search and tracking."' Furthermore, he restated his inability to accept the concept of a mobile air force for the mid-Pacific area. Most points were too weakly held and lacked service facilities; distances over water between the landing fields were too great to permit rapid movement of fighter reinforcements where needed, and the logic was inexorable- "more and more" planes must be stationed on the advanced bases, including AAF fighters for Marine use, because a t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes would be inferior to the AAF land-based planes.lo8Fulfilment of the admiral's demands with regard to increasing the static defense of the Pacific obviously would have altered the existing schedule of commit- ments, for AAF doctrine maintained that aircraft never would be produced in quantity sufficient to permit such a static defense. Thus the debate continued. AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never permit the scat- tering of substantial air forces over the Pacific isles to serve as fixed defenses; furthermore, they pointed to the fact that more planes in Oahu would not have helped Midway, which already was saturated and could not absorb all the planes then a~ai1able.l'~As for drawing upon their inadequate store of heavy bombers to supply the Navy, they asserted instead that since search and tracking were admittedly functions best performed by the land-based planes, these should pass to the control of the AAF."' However, because any increment to the Pacific would cut directly into commitments for the European theater, it would be impossible to increase the flow of heavy bombers to the Pacific. If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their search mission, this was a loss which could not be avoided, and in any case it would result in a lower attrition rate than that arising from normal bomber and fighter operations over reasonably defended areas.l'l One of Midway's legacies was an enduring debate. Attack Upon the Aleutians When Admiral Nimitz first learned of the projected attack upon Midway, he knew that he might expect an offensive thrust against the Aleutians. The enemy apparently had considered a t least Kiska, Attu, and Adak as possible outposts a t the beginning of the war, but the details had not been worked out until the Midway campaign was planned.l12 Adak was also regarded as a northern base for patrol 462
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