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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C this there is some positive evidence. Reports reached the Yamato that a vessel was hurt, but thereafter the damage seems to have been inflicted almost exclusively by dive bombers. Certainly the enemy feared them most. During the engagement on the qth, the battleship H m n a received some slight damage to her stern plates from a near miss and it is possible that this damage might have come from heavy bombers, but the survivors of that ship are positive that dive bombers hurt thern.lo5 O n the afternoon of the same day, crews of the six bombers which attacked a t 3,600 feet were positive that they scored a hit on a destroyer; enemy records indicate that one such vessel was damaged, but they fail to reveal the source of the bomb. Beyond this point it is not possible to go, and the claims must remain hidden in the fog of war. Vessels already afire when brought under attack by the B-17’s did not easily lend themselves to accurate determination of direct bomb hits from observers 15,000 to ~0,000feet in the air. How- ever, even though the heavies had not scored many direct hits, Japa- nese officers asserted that the B-17’s had caused the enemy craft to break up their formations as they maneuvered radically to avoid the falling bombs, thereby decreasing their power of mutual support and leaving them more vulnerable to dive-bomber attack.lo6 It is possible that a higher score might have been achieved had B- I 7 pilots and bom- bardiers approached the action in a less exhausted state and had they been permitted to train adequately in the months prior to Midway rather than devote most of their time to search, but the subsequent events of the Pacific war would indicate otherwise. Japanese ships a t sea would not be sunk or hit with any degree of success until the attacking eplanes were brought down to minimum levels. T h e impact of Midway upon the concept of Pacific air war held by the Navy and the AAF was considerable, setting off a train of debate which continued long after the sea battle had ended. In the light of the Japanese evidence and because of the very limited number of B- I 7’s involved, there can be little question that AAF contribution was insufficient to check the enemy’s advance. Torpedo planes of both services had suffered costly losses, and the dive bomber had won the day. But the AAF B- I 7 had proved itself superior to the PBY in ful- filling the vital requirement of continuous tracking. Both types could search the sea; yet once the contact was made, it was the B- I 7 rather than the PBY which could stand up to strong enemy air opposition and cling to the contact. Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
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