The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
this there is some positive evidence. Reports reached the Yamato that
a vessel was hurt, but thereafter the damage seems to have been
inflicted almost exclusively by dive bombers. Certainly the enemy
feared them most. During the engagement on the qth, the battleship
H m n a received some slight damage to her stern plates from a near
miss and it is possible that this damage might have come from heavy
bombers, but the survivors of that ship are positive that dive bombers
hurt thern.lo5 O n the afternoon of the same day, crews of the six
bombers which attacked a t 3,600 feet were positive that they scored a
hit on a destroyer; enemy records indicate that one such vessel was
damaged, but they fail to reveal the source of the bomb. Beyond this
point it is not possible to go, and the claims must remain hidden in the
fog of war. Vessels already afire when brought under attack by the
B-17’s did not easily lend themselves to accurate determination of
direct bomb hits from observers 15,000 to ~0,000feet in the air. How-
ever, even though the heavies had not scored many direct hits, Japa-
nese officers asserted that the B-17’s had caused the enemy craft to
break up their formations as they maneuvered radically to avoid the
falling bombs, thereby decreasing their power of mutual support and
leaving them more vulnerable to dive-bomber attack.lo6 It is possible
that a higher score might have been achieved had B- I 7 pilots and bom-
bardiers approached the action in a less exhausted state and had they
been permitted to train adequately in the months prior to Midway
rather than devote most of their time to search, but the subsequent
events of the Pacific war would indicate otherwise. Japanese ships a t
sea would not be sunk or hit with any degree of success until the
attacking eplanes were brought down to minimum levels.
T h e impact of Midway upon the concept of Pacific air war held by
the Navy and the AAF was considerable, setting off a train of debate
which continued long after the sea battle had ended. In the light of
the Japanese evidence and because of the very limited number of
B- I 7’s involved, there can be little question that AAF contribution
was insufficient to check the enemy’s advance. Torpedo planes of both
services had suffered costly losses, and the dive bomber had won the
day. But the AAF B- I 7 had proved itself superior to the PBY in ful-
filling the vital requirement of continuous tracking. Both types could
search the sea; yet once the contact was made, it was the B- I 7 rather
than the PBY which could stand up to strong enemy air opposition
and cling to the contact. Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi-
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