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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 40 …On recommendation of an American mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col. Raynal…
  • p. 50 …a r I1 and its self- conceived mission can be appreciated only in light of a…
  • p. 52 …In the lower grades, where promotion was controlled inexorably by seniority, Air Service pilots found themselves…
  • p. 56 …complete control of the Army and form an integral part thereof.” Yet the Crowell mission, appointed…
  • p. 60 …The Lampert Committee went far beyond its designated mission, bringing under review the whole province of…
  • p. 63 …to it a more or less independent mission. Experi- ence in World War I seemed to…
  • p. 65 …Command respon- sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com- manding General…
  • p. 66 …Navy in further- awe of their respective missions. The Air Corps Tactical School claimed for air…
  • p. 69 …which fights for and gains control of the air,’’ and to calculate a well-balanced air…
  • p. 71 …Mitchell could still believe that “it was an established fact that the principal mission of an…
  • p. 80 …based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid the ground forces to gain…
  • p. 81 …The mission of the Army was defense of the United States and its outlying territories, but…
  • p. 129 …assigned to the air force an independent mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March 1918 the…
  • p. 155 …By taking control of French or English colonial possessions, victorious Axis powers might lodge themselves at…
  • p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the US. Army and Navy…
  • p. 235 …Long-standing differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of offshore patrol had brought…
  • p. 241 …And because the chain of command in both Pacific areas and in Washington vested ultimate control…
  • p. 270 …Other combat activity by pursuit piiots was incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions, as when on I…
  • p. 273 …Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~ It soon became evident, however…
  • p. 295 …American forces in Burma, and later in India, had as a primary mission the promotion of…
  • p. 306 …The mission of the MAB was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources…
  • p. 308 …of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the training of the tactical…
  • p. 314 …The field forces remained under the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division…
  • p. 316 …General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com- plete, virtually, as is…
  • p. 317 …it also made possible a certain indirect control from Washington through letters written more often in…
  • p. 343 …To permit effective control of fighter planes at night or during bad weather would have required…
  • p. 368 …constituted as of 29 May.’l The mission of the new command was, first, “to move…
  • p. 379 …A North African military mission under Brig. Gen. Russell H. Maxwell had been established at Cairo…
  • p. 397 …In helping to prepare HALPRO for overseas movement by air and in controlling the flight along…
  • p. 412 …to perform a series of remarkable special missions. Shuttling between Australia, the Philippines, the Nether- lands…
  • p. 426 …formation of task forces to undertake specific missions, and for their command he was to designate…
  • p. 441 …But of these, four missions involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un…
  • p. 458 …During January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi- mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a…
  • p. 464 …attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’ If the Americans on Bataan and…
  • p. 472 …naval control, during which time six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against…
  • p. 475 …Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest expenditure of time and effort. Until…
  • p. 500 …remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l…
  • p. 503 …But circumstances beyond the control of the aircrews were against the flight. Although a fortuitous and…
  • p. 525 …of Midway, nor had it retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to…
  • p. 527 …If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their search mission, this was a…
  • p. 549 …those who had flown their first combat mission in April had to fight a feeling of…
  • p. 571 …largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers- would remain under theater control but…
  • p. 589 …This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air forces. As late…
  • p. 620 …At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to its own mission and by the end…
  • p. 621 …It would work in conjunction with naval forces and under their operational control “wherever this may…
  • p. 646 …the British Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission at London.” The American…
  • p. 647 …General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission…
  • p. 648 …Air forces would have two missions: to pro- vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 651 …Military Mission in London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S . Field Forces…
  • p. 654 …They consider that function their primary mission here and are not willing to surrender it.1le…
  • p. 659 …bombardment missions, either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic control of AAF operations…
  • p. 669 …o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required numerous modifications for the plane-about…
  • p. 683 …not be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYM- NAST. H e…
  • p. 684 …T o adapt the Eighth Air Force to its new mission required a con- siderable reshuffling…
  • p. 717 …develop- ment of adequate machinery for the control of combat operations by establishing the Provisional I…
  • p. 728 …2 , 27 AUGUST 2942 HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere charged…
  • p. 730 …in preparation for initial operations under RAF control. Each of the three squadrons was attached for…
  • p. 731 …Policy concerning the pro- vision and control of fighter escort had not yet been determined, but…
  • p. 735 …Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower spotted a cluster of specks to the…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
this there is some positive evidence. Reports reached the Yamato that
a vessel was hurt, but thereafter the damage seems to have been
inflicted almost exclusively by dive bombers. Certainly the enemy
feared them most. During the engagement on the qth, the battleship
H m n a received some slight damage to her stern plates from a near
miss and it is possible that this damage might have come from heavy
bombers, but the survivors of that ship are positive that dive bombers
hurt thern.lo5 O n the afternoon of the same day, crews of the six
bombers which attacked a t 3,600 feet were positive that they scored a
hit on a destroyer; enemy records indicate that one such vessel was
damaged, but they fail to reveal the source of the bomb. Beyond this
point it is not possible to go, and the claims must remain hidden in the
fog of war. Vessels already afire when brought under attack by the
B-17’s did not easily lend themselves to accurate determination of
direct bomb hits from observers 15,000 to ~0,000feet in the air. How-
ever, even though the heavies had not scored many direct hits, Japa-
nese officers asserted that the B-17’s had caused the enemy craft to
break up their formations as they maneuvered radically to avoid the
falling bombs, thereby decreasing their power of mutual support and
leaving them more vulnerable to dive-bomber attack.lo6 It is possible
that a higher score might have been achieved had B- I 7 pilots and bom-
bardiers approached the action in a less exhausted state and had they
been permitted to train adequately in the months prior to Midway
rather than devote most of their time to search, but the subsequent
events of the Pacific war would indicate otherwise. Japanese ships a t
sea would not be sunk or hit with any degree of success until the
attacking eplanes were brought down to minimum levels.
T h e impact of Midway upon the concept of Pacific air war held by
the Navy and the AAF was considerable, setting off a train of debate
which continued long after the sea battle had ended. In the light of
the Japanese evidence and because of the very limited number of
B- I 7’s involved, there can be little question that AAF contribution
was insufficient to check the enemy’s advance. Torpedo planes of both
services had suffered costly losses, and the dive bomber had won the
day. But the AAF B- I 7 had proved itself superior to the PBY in ful-
filling the vital requirement of continuous tracking. Both types could
search the sea; yet once the contact was made, it was the B- I 7 rather
than the PBY which could stand up to strong enemy air opposition
and cling to the contact. Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi-
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