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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 to meet the requirements set by standard AAF doctrine." Thus, the number of aircraft available fell far below the minimum demanded in order to achieve a profitable pattern for attaining hits upon even one carrier maneuvering at high speed, causing air commanders to feel that severe criticism of the B-17 performance was not altogether justified, for Midway was not a test of the bomber. They noted that the AAF had played no part in planning the defense of Midway, nor had it retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to the island outpost; they noted, too, that critiques of the battle had indi- cated a tendency to rush the attacks upon the carriers at long ranges without adequate planning for co-ordination, with the result that the torpedo squadrons had suffered disastrous losses. Even General Hale had no advance knowledge of the composition of the enemy surface forces his bombers would face.'" One of the most serious handicaps was the lack of adequate servicing facilities or personnel on Midway, where the combat crews not only flew long, exhausting, daily missions but to a large extent were forced to do their own servicing and maintenance. Destruction of the power- house on Eastern Island by enemy bombing on 4 June further compli- cated this situation, completely disrupting the only available refueling system, thereby making it necessary for the tired crews to spend long hours servicing their planes from cans and drums, although in this task they were aided by Marine ground troops on the i~1and.l'~A further factor was the rapid exhaustion of the crews of the combat planes in long I ,800-mile reconnaissance missions prior to combat; General Hale had protested in vain against the practice of sending out his B - 1 7 ' S against unknown targets, but he was overruled despite the fact that prior to the search mission of I June, his crews had not enjoyed seven hours' sleep in two days.lo4 A complete assessment of their achievements is not possible, but certainly the above factors contributed to the sharp downward revi- sion of claims necessitated by Japanese reports. It is probable that one hit was obtained in the initial attack of 3 June upon the transports; for * It is of interest to note that immediately prior to the Battle of Midway, Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson reported 'from Hawii that a force of no less than 90 to IOO heavy bombers would be necessary to assure the probabilit of 7 per cent hits on an enemy force of five carriers. He based this figure on earlier xornbing experience which indicated that even from the relatively low altitudes of IZ,OOO to 14,000 feet, at least eighteen to twenty planes would be required to insure 7 per cent hits on a single maneuvering surface craft. (Report from Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson to Chief of Staff, I June 1942.) 460
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