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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
been demonstrated repeatedly that damage to carriers is particularly
difficult to assess from the air. With this in mind, it would seem that
the first attack produced a probable hit upon one transport, causing a
small fire which was extinguished without delaying the ship, but that
the combat craft escaped damage in the attack.g5
T h e first blow had been struck without slowing the enemy; but out
into the night four PBY’s moved toward the transports, found them by
radar at 0130 on the qth, put one torpedo into the tanker Akebono
Maru, and strafed the column of transports, causing some casual tie^.^^
T h e 4th of June was the day of the real battle. PBY’s were off early
on their searches for the main enemy force, which had not yet been
located; B-17’s were in the air; B-26’s, TBF’s, and MAG-22 planes
were warmed and ready. At 054s the news was in: a patrol plane had
sighted many planes heading for Midway at a point 150 miles to the
north and west; radars confirmed the report. Seven minutes later,
PBY’s sighted the enemy’s carrier force. Midway was ready. T h e four
B-26’s led by Capt. James F. Collins, Jr., and the six TBF’s were off to
attack the carriers, Marine dive bombers and fighters were sent aloft,
and the flight of 14 B- 17’salready in the air and on its way toward the
transports was diverted north a a i n s t the carriers. At 0705 the B-26’s
and TBF’s sighted the carriers with their supporting heavy ships; they
attacked through heavy fighter defense and flak with no fighter sup-
port of their own, only to lose two of the B-26’s and five of the Navy’s
new Grumman torpedo planes. Lt. James P. Muri and Captain Collins
brought their badly shot-up planes home to Midway after their gallant
attack, but they had scored no hits, nor had the TBF’s; on this point
enemy survivors are u n a n i m o u ~ . ~ ~All the Japanese carriers were ham-
mered by the B- I 7’s and by dive and torpedo bombers from the three
U.S. carriers, and one by one the ships caught fire and sank. T h e
Soryu had been hit heavily by dive bombers, then was torpedoed by
the submarine Nautilus at 1359, sinking at 1610.’~T h e Kaga, too,
went down a few minutes later, while the Hiryu) escaping the earlier
attacks, was caught by dive bombers from the Enterprise and the
Hornet late in the afternoon. T h e ship sank early on the sth, together
with the Akaga, but not before it was found by six B-17’s en route
from Oahu to Midway. The bombers attacked from 3,600 feet at
1610, then strafed the carrier’s decks, and claimed hits upon a
d e ~ t r o y e r . ~
b.
458

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