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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
been demonstrated repeatedly that damage to carriers is particularly
difficult to assess from the air. With this in mind, it would seem that
the first attack produced a probable hit upon one transport, causing a
small fire which was extinguished without delaying the ship, but that
the combat craft escaped damage in the attack.g5
T h e first blow had been struck without slowing the enemy; but out
into the night four PBY’s moved toward the transports, found them by
radar at 0130 on the qth, put one torpedo into the tanker Akebono
Maru, and strafed the column of transports, causing some casual tie^.^^
T h e 4th of June was the day of the real battle. PBY’s were off early
on their searches for the main enemy force, which had not yet been
located; B-17’s were in the air; B-26’s, TBF’s, and MAG-22 planes
were warmed and ready. At 054s the news was in: a patrol plane had
sighted many planes heading for Midway at a point 150 miles to the
north and west; radars confirmed the report. Seven minutes later,
PBY’s sighted the enemy’s carrier force. Midway was ready. T h e four
B-26’s led by Capt. James F. Collins, Jr., and the six TBF’s were off to
attack the carriers, Marine dive bombers and fighters were sent aloft,
and the flight of 14 B- 17’salready in the air and on its way toward the
transports was diverted north a a i n s t the carriers. At 0705 the B-26’s
and TBF’s sighted the carriers with their supporting heavy ships; they
attacked through heavy fighter defense and flak with no fighter sup-
port of their own, only to lose two of the B-26’s and five of the Navy’s
new Grumman torpedo planes. Lt. James P. Muri and Captain Collins
brought their badly shot-up planes home to Midway after their gallant
attack, but they had scored no hits, nor had the TBF’s; on this point
enemy survivors are u n a n i m o u ~ . ~ ~All the Japanese carriers were ham-
mered by the B- I 7’s and by dive and torpedo bombers from the three
U.S. carriers, and one by one the ships caught fire and sank. T h e
Soryu had been hit heavily by dive bombers, then was torpedoed by
the submarine Nautilus at 1359, sinking at 1610.’~T h e Kaga, too,
went down a few minutes later, while the Hiryu) escaping the earlier
attacks, was caught by dive bombers from the Enterprise and the
Hornet late in the afternoon. T h e ship sank early on the sth, together
with the Akaga, but not before it was found by six B-17’s en route
from Oahu to Midway. The bombers attacked from 3,600 feet at
1610, then strafed the carrier’s decks, and claimed hits upon a
d e ~ t r o y e r . ~
b.
458

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.