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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
was to discover the enemy fleet as early as possible and to strike it
before it could draw within carrier range of the island. Accordingly,
on 30 May, in order to place the heavy bombers as far forward as
possible, six B-17’s of the 26th Bombardment Squadron (H) were
flown up to Midway, followed on the next day by six more from the
431s Squadron, two from the 31st, and one from the 72d.” In addi-
tion to these forces, two casually attached squadrons en route to the
South Pacific, the 18th Reconnaissance and the 69th Bombardment
squadrons, each contributed two torpedo-carrying €3-2 6’s which were
flown up to Midway, along with six of the Navy’s new TBF”.’’ With
all these reinforcements, Midway was badly overcrowded. By 3 June,
Captain Simard had available on the tiny islet a force of 30 PBY’s, 4
B-2 6’s, I 7 B- I 7’s, and 6 TBF’s, all in addition to the planes of MAG-2 2.
Behind Midway and off to the northeast the carriers Y o r k t o m , Enter-
prise, and Hornet had rendezvoused on 2 June after racing up from
the South Pacific following the Coral Sea action. This was something
the enemy did not know and would not know until the dive bombers
struck him.
All these forces, every plane, would be needed, for the bulk of the
Japanese imperial navy was converging upon Midway; if ever it could
break through to the island, it could overwhelm the defenses. From
the northwest, under Admiral Nagumo, came a task force of four
of the enemy’s most effective carriers, supported by two battleships.
From Saipan to the southwest, under Vice Admiral Kondo and
screened by a powerful surface force including two more battleships,
came the transports, carrying approximately 2,500 army troops and
special naval landing forces to occupy the two islands comprising
Midway; and out to the west of the island aboard the tremendous
Yamato was Admiral Yamamoto himself, leading the main body of
the fleet with most of the remaining heavy units of the imperial
navy.91
The burden of long-range search rested upon the PBY-5A’s and the
B-17’s; twelve of the latter covered long arcs extending 800 miles out
from Midway on 31 May and I June, but they sighted nothing and
they could not cover the area lying beyond 300 to 400 miles northwest
of their base, for here visibility was Their efforts held the flight
crews aloft for thirty hours in the two days prior to combat, nor
could the crews rest in the intervals between flights, for it was neces-
sary for them to service their own planes, in co-operation with the
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