“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
be organized from the 301st and 303d heavy groups in the Second Air
Force. T h e estimated date of departure from the West Coast was 30
May, with completion of movement scheduled for z June. Actually,
the sixteen crews were drawn from the 303d Group; and after the
emergency had passed, these crews returned to the Second Air Force,
leaving their B- I 7’s in Hawaii.85
In the ten-day period following the establishment of the alert, the
old B-18’s flew their search missions, carrying on the work of the
newer B- I 7’s which now were held on the ground, loaded with 500-
and 600-lb. demolition bombs, in anticipation of their employment as
a striking force. O n the I8th, General Emmons had on hand for his
5th and 11th Bombardment groups a total of only 34 B - I ~ ’ s ,7 of
which were older “C” and “D” models and were regarded as being
insufficiently armed for combat. However, through the period of the
alert, the VII Bomber Command received a steady influx of B-17’s,
with the result that by the last day of May it had in commission 44 out
of 56 available B-17’s, 14 of 16 B-18’s, 4 of 6 B-26’s, and 5 of 7 A-20%.
For local defense, VII Fighter Command had in commission I O I P-40’s
out of 134 in the area, 17 P-39’s of 22, and 2 2 obsolete P-36’~of ~ 8 . ’ ~
Actually, fresh planes were coming out more rapidly than existing
squadrons could absorb them; no less than 60 B-17’~arrived in
the period from 18 May to 10June. These bombers, arriving from the
mainland in the morning, were taken immediately to the shops of the
Hawaiian Air Depot, where their extra fuel tanks used on the flight
out from the West Coast were removed, auxiliary tanks were installed
in the radio compartment, and equipment and armament were
checked. Within 24 hours these new planes were turned over to the
tactical units, but time was running out; there would be no oppor-
tunity to train all the crews in the operation of their new weapons.
For example, the heavy increase made it necessary to convert the 72d
Bombardment Squadron from a B- I 8 unit to a B- I 7 squadron, a proc-
ess which began on 4 May, but the 72d was not fully equipped until
approximately two days prior to commitment to actual combat. Obvi-
ously it could not be trained adequately.”
At Midway, Marine ground forces worked night and day to prepare
the defenses of the islands, and Marine Aircraft Group 2 2 (MAG-22)
based on Midway was brought up to strength to include 28 fighters
and 34 dive bombers.*’ T h e primary aim of Midway’s air commander,
Capt. Cyril T. Simard, USN, under whom all AAF planes operated,
455