The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
be organized from the 301st and 303d heavy groups in the Second Air
Force. T h e estimated date of departure from the West Coast was 30
May, with completion of movement scheduled for z June. Actually,
the sixteen crews were drawn from the 303d Group; and after the
emergency had passed, these crews returned to the Second Air Force,
leaving their B- I 7’s in Hawaii.85
In the ten-day period following the establishment of the alert, the
old B-18’s flew their search missions, carrying on the work of the
newer B- I 7’s which now were held on the ground, loaded with 500-
and 600-lb. demolition bombs, in anticipation of their employment as
a striking force. O n the I8th, General Emmons had on hand for his
5th and 11th Bombardment groups a total of only 34 B - I ~ ’ s ,7 of
which were older “C” and “D” models and were regarded as being
insufficiently armed for combat. However, through the period of the
alert, the VII Bomber Command received a steady influx of B-17’s,
with the result that by the last day of May it had in commission 44 out
of 56 available B-17’s, 14 of 16 B-18’s, 4 of 6 B-26’s, and 5 of 7 A-20%.
For local defense, VII Fighter Command had in commission I O I P-40’s
out of 134 in the area, 17 P-39’s of 22, and 2 2 obsolete P-36’~of ~ 8 . ’ ~
Actually, fresh planes were coming out more rapidly than existing
squadrons could absorb them; no less than 60 B-17’~arrived in
the period from 18 May to 10June. These bombers, arriving from the
mainland in the morning, were taken immediately to the shops of the
Hawaiian Air Depot, where their extra fuel tanks used on the flight
out from the West Coast were removed, auxiliary tanks were installed
in the radio compartment, and equipment and armament were
checked. Within 24 hours these new planes were turned over to the
tactical units, but time was running out; there would be no oppor-
tunity to train all the crews in the operation of their new weapons.
For example, the heavy increase made it necessary to convert the 72d
Bombardment Squadron from a B- I 8 unit to a B- I 7 squadron, a proc-
ess which began on 4 May, but the 72d was not fully equipped until
approximately two days prior to commitment to actual combat. Obvi-
ously it could not be trained adequately.”
At Midway, Marine ground forces worked night and day to prepare
the defenses of the islands, and Marine Aircraft Group 2 2 (MAG-22)
based on Midway was brought up to strength to include 28 fighters
and 34 dive bombers.*’ T h e primary aim of Midway’s air commander,
Capt. Cyril T. Simard, USN, under whom all AAF planes operated,
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