“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Southwest Under Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker, who
assumed command on 29 March 1942, the Seventh would assist in the
defense of the Hawaiian group, and as rapidly as possible it would
train combat crews. As an additional major function, it would modify
and maintain aircraft for the combat units in the South and Southwest
Pacific.
After Pearl Harbor, one of the first problems to be met was that of
servicing and supplying the tactical air units in the Hawaiian area.79
While the service units labored to restore some order to the battered
force, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these
were sent out as rapidly as possible; fortunately, Emmons was granted
a five-month period of grace after the initial Japanese attack. N o
aerial combat with enemy aircraft occurred during these months, but
both fighter and bomber commanders were able to offer several
assessments of their equipment and operational techniques. Brig. Gen.
H.C. Davidson, commanding the VII Interceptor Command, expressed
dissatisfaction with both the P-40 and P-39D as interceptors; neither
could operate at high altitudes, and the former had an unsatisfactory
rate of climb.soBombardment commanders learned that the continuous
alerts and long-range sea searches conducted from the island bases
placed a heavy strain upon flight personnel, making duplicate crews
a necessity; and they regretted the lack of opportunity for training
their bombardiers and gunners.'l Admiral Nimitz had placed the VII
Bomber Command under control of Patrol Wing Two (Patwing 2),
and until I April all aircraft were assigned either to search or to a
striking force, thus leaving only a bare minimum time free for training.
However, on I April approximately 2 5 per cent of the aircraft were
made available for limited trainings2 But neither General Emmons
nor Richardson was satisfied with the strength under Army control,
which by I May was to include 3 2 heavy bombers on hand with 17
more en route, 9 light bombers, and a total of 182 fighter aircraft,
although only 87 of the latter were regarded as of modem types.83
On 18 May, the entire Seventh Air Force was placed on special
alert in anticipation of the enemy threat, for an air raid on Hawaii or
an attack upon Midway was expected any time after 24 May.84 In
response to the urgent appeals from the theater, the W a r Department
notified General Emmons that two additional heavy bombardment
squadrons of eight B- I 7E's each, including air combat crews, would
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