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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 40 …On recommendation of an American mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col. Raynal…
  • p. 50 …a r I1 and its self- conceived mission can be appreciated only in light of a…
  • p. 52 …In the lower grades, where promotion was controlled inexorably by seniority, Air Service pilots found themselves…
  • p. 56 …complete control of the Army and form an integral part thereof.” Yet the Crowell mission, appointed…
  • p. 60 …The Lampert Committee went far beyond its designated mission, bringing under review the whole province of…
  • p. 63 …to it a more or less independent mission. Experi- ence in World War I seemed to…
  • p. 65 …Command respon- sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com- manding General…
  • p. 66 …Navy in further- awe of their respective missions. The Air Corps Tactical School claimed for air…
  • p. 69 …which fights for and gains control of the air,’’ and to calculate a well-balanced air…
  • p. 71 …Mitchell could still believe that “it was an established fact that the principal mission of an…
  • p. 80 …based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid the ground forces to gain…
  • p. 81 …The mission of the Army was defense of the United States and its outlying territories, but…
  • p. 129 …assigned to the air force an independent mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March 1918 the…
  • p. 155 …By taking control of French or English colonial possessions, victorious Axis powers might lodge themselves at…
  • p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the US. Army and Navy…
  • p. 235 …Long-standing differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of offshore patrol had brought…
  • p. 241 …And because the chain of command in both Pacific areas and in Washington vested ultimate control…
  • p. 270 …Other combat activity by pursuit piiots was incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions, as when on I…
  • p. 273 …Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~ It soon became evident, however…
  • p. 295 …American forces in Burma, and later in India, had as a primary mission the promotion of…
  • p. 306 …The mission of the MAB was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources…
  • p. 308 …of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the training of the tactical…
  • p. 314 …The field forces remained under the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division…
  • p. 316 …General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com- plete, virtually, as is…
  • p. 317 …it also made possible a certain indirect control from Washington through letters written more often in…
  • p. 343 …To permit effective control of fighter planes at night or during bad weather would have required…
  • p. 368 …constituted as of 29 May.’l The mission of the new command was, first, “to move…
  • p. 379 …A North African military mission under Brig. Gen. Russell H. Maxwell had been established at Cairo…
  • p. 397 …In helping to prepare HALPRO for overseas movement by air and in controlling the flight along…
  • p. 412 …to perform a series of remarkable special missions. Shuttling between Australia, the Philippines, the Nether- lands…
  • p. 426 …formation of task forces to undertake specific missions, and for their command he was to designate…
  • p. 441 …But of these, four missions involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un…
  • p. 458 …During January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi- mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a…
  • p. 464 …attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’ If the Americans on Bataan and…
  • p. 472 …naval control, during which time six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against…
  • p. 475 …Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest expenditure of time and effort. Until…
  • p. 500 …remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l…
  • p. 503 …But circumstances beyond the control of the aircrews were against the flight. Although a fortuitous and…
  • p. 525 …of Midway, nor had it retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to…
  • p. 527 …If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their search mission, this was a…
  • p. 549 …those who had flown their first combat mission in April had to fight a feeling of…
  • p. 571 …largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers- would remain under theater control but…
  • p. 589 …This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air forces. As late…
  • p. 620 …At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to its own mission and by the end…
  • p. 621 …It would work in conjunction with naval forces and under their operational control “wherever this may…
  • p. 646 …the British Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission at London.” The American…
  • p. 647 …General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission…
  • p. 648 …Air forces would have two missions: to pro- vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 651 …Military Mission in London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S . Field Forces…
  • p. 654 …They consider that function their primary mission here and are not willing to surrender it.1le…
  • p. 659 …bombardment missions, either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic control of AAF operations…
  • p. 669 …o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required numerous modifications for the plane-about…
  • p. 683 …not be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYM- NAST. H e…
  • p. 684 …T o adapt the Eighth Air Force to its new mission required a con- siderable reshuffling…
  • p. 717 …develop- ment of adequate machinery for the control of combat operations by establishing the Provisional I…
  • p. 728 …2 , 27 AUGUST 2942 HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere charged…
  • p. 730 …in preparation for initial operations under RAF control. Each of the three squadrons was attached for…
  • p. 731 …Policy concerning the pro- vision and control of fighter escort had not yet been determined, but…
  • p. 735 …Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower spotted a cluster of specks to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
imperial general staff to the plan. After some discussion, the views of
the admirals prevailed and the enormous collection of surface power
was set in motion. Beyond Midway lay Hawaii; perhaps it, too, could
be brought under attack at a later date if all went well. At any rate,
it was believed that successful occupation of Midway would increase
the probability of drawing out American heavy
Back at Pearl Harbor, Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander in chief
of the Pacific Ocean Area, could not know of the debates in the upper
levels of the Japanese command. However, by I 5 May naval decoders
and intelligence officers were aware that a blow was coming. They
knew that an attempt would be made to occupy Midway and points in
the Aleutians, although nothing was known as to enemy intentions
against Hawaii, a point upon which the Japanese themselves were
uncertain. The exact date of the offensive was not known, but it was
believed that the fleet would begin to move out from Japan and Saipan
around 20 May.75 For Admiral Nimitz, there was a very slender
margin of time remaining in which to mobilize all possible defenses.
There was no assurance that the three carriers in the South Pacific
could be returned to Hawaii in time to protect Midway, and it was
necessary to meet the threat to Alaska by dispatching northward all
available spare combat ships, a force which included five cruisers and
four destroyers.'' AAF participation in the approaching battle would
be the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force, whose units were
receiving reinforcements from the West Coast, but whose strength
Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, after extended conferences with
Nimitz and Emmons, still regarded as inadequate to assure the security
of the Alaska-Hawaii-Samoa-Australia line."
T h e Japanese had dealt the Hawaiian Air Force a devastating blow
on 7 December, destroying its planes, its equipment, and over zoo of
its personnel, losses demanding the most rapid possible replacement.
But despite all the reinforcements which had come out to the islands
in December following the Japanese attack, the Seventh Air Force,
as it was designated on 5 February, was not yet an offensive air force-
it would not acquire this status until November 1943. For the pres-
ent, it would remain a holding force which by January could report
the presence of 43 heavy bombers, 24 light and medium bombers, and
203 pursuit planes. These would have to suffice. In the ensuing four
months, no more planes were to be sent to Hawaii; in fact, twelve of
the heavies were withdrawn during February and dispatched to the
452

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