The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
These were difficulties which could be overcome with the passage
of time, and for the most part they were overcome as the war pro-
gressed and as improved channels of communication between the
services were developed. But the results of the Coral Sea action left a
sense of frustration among the AAF crews who had participated in this
engagement against the Japanese.
Midway
The Coral Sea battle represented the last full-scale attempt of the
enemy to extend his perimeter to the south by direct amphibious
assault, excluding his effort to recover Guadalcanal in November 1942,
but even as his task force retired northward, preparations were under
way for additional thrusts. This time the Japanese would drive to the
north and east, and their goal would be the establishment of outposts
on Midway and in the outer Aleutians. These represented extremely
ambitious operations, but even after the rebuff in the attempt to cap-
ture Moresby, there was reason to anticipate success, for the Japanese
fleet remained in sound condition, very little of its strength having
been sapped in the Coral Sea. T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku had to go to Kure for repairs
and the Zuikaku required rehabilitation of her air personnel before
she could sortie again.71But ample carrier pilots and planes were avail-
able for all the others, and Admiral Yamamoto was prepared to throw
almost his entire force at Midway.
His reasons are not altogether clear. One aim seems to have been
the extension of the eastern outpost from Wake to Midway simul-
taneously with the establishment of a northern picket in the Aleutians.
Midway would serve as a useful base for air co-operation with the
fleet, since like Marcus and Wake, it could support search planes; and
Yamamoto believed that possession of bases a t such a distance was
essential to the over-all success of the navy's plan,72for an attempt to
take Midway might provoke the desired major surface engagement
with the U.S. fleet. Then to these considerations must be added the
effect of the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. Although some thought seems
to have been given early in the war to the seizure of Midway, the B-2 5
attack upon Tokyo confirmed the need for eastward expansion in
order to deprive U.S. forces of every psssible base which might serve
as a springboard against Japan.73Before Yamamoto could undertake
his venture, however, he first had to overcome the resistance of the
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