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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Italian Air Force”14 pages
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C These were difficulties which could be overcome with the passage of time, and for the most part they were overcome as the war pro- gressed and as improved channels of communication between the services were developed. But the results of the Coral Sea action left a sense of frustration among the AAF crews who had participated in this engagement against the Japanese. Midway The Coral Sea battle represented the last full-scale attempt of the enemy to extend his perimeter to the south by direct amphibious assault, excluding his effort to recover Guadalcanal in November 1942, but even as his task force retired northward, preparations were under way for additional thrusts. This time the Japanese would drive to the north and east, and their goal would be the establishment of outposts on Midway and in the outer Aleutians. These represented extremely ambitious operations, but even after the rebuff in the attempt to cap- ture Moresby, there was reason to anticipate success, for the Japanese fleet remained in sound condition, very little of its strength having been sapped in the Coral Sea. T o be sure, it would be impossible to use Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku had to go to Kure for repairs and the Zuikaku required rehabilitation of her air personnel before she could sortie again.71But ample carrier pilots and planes were avail- able for all the others, and Admiral Yamamoto was prepared to throw almost his entire force at Midway. His reasons are not altogether clear. One aim seems to have been the extension of the eastern outpost from Wake to Midway simul- taneously with the establishment of a northern picket in the Aleutians. Midway would serve as a useful base for air co-operation with the fleet, since like Marcus and Wake, it could support search planes; and Yamamoto believed that possession of bases a t such a distance was essential to the over-all success of the navy's plan,72for an attempt to take Midway might provoke the desired major surface engagement with the U.S. fleet. Then to these considerations must be added the effect of the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. Although some thought seems to have been given early in the war to the seizure of Midway, the B-2 5 attack upon Tokyo confirmed the need for eastward expansion in order to deprive U.S. forces of every psssible base which might serve as a springboard against Japan.73Before Yamamoto could undertake his venture, however, he first had to overcome the resistance of the 45'
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