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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 land-based planes had carried out extensive reconnaissance of the Solomons area from New Ireland southeastward to the eastern bound- ary of the Southwest Pacific Area: they flew armed patrols along the New Guinea coast eastward to the Louisiade islands and thence west- ward to Port Moresby, over the Coral Sea west of Tulagi, through- out the Bismarck Archipelago, across the mouth of the Gulf of Carpentaria, and in the Darwin area. Operations were hampered somewhat by unfavorable weather, by the great distances which had to be flown, by the absence of fighter protection for bombers, and by the inability of the B-17'~to hit rapidly moving surface targets from high altitudes when bombing singly or in small flights6? The entire action had indicated a lack of co-ordination between the Navy and the AAF which under different circumstances might have cost the Navy more serious damage than it suffered a t the hands of the Japa- nese, for in the Coral Sea, some of the AAF planes had dropped their bombs upon friendly ships. One week after the battle, General MacArthur reported that com- plete co-ordination with naval forces had been attained.68 Yet, if co-ordination did exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level there was little or none, and this was a factor which had hampered the forces in Australia in their attempts to operate with the Navy. Men of the 19th Group were forced to admit that they had attacked U.S. naval units, but they pointed to a reason. Few of them had received adequate training in recognition of surface craft as they fought through the Philippines and Java campaigns, but more important, none of the intelligence officers had any information as to the location of the friendly task forces; nor had any identification signals with surface craft been established bef~rehand.~'This lack of information on naval plans worked a very real hardship on the bombardment commanders. Prior to the May battle, they were unaware either of the Navy's presence or of its plans. They knew only that occasionally they would be requested on short notice to co-operate in a naval operation, but because the strik- ing force was widely scattered along the rail line between Townsville and Cloncurry, it was necessary to fly the aircraft some 600 to 800 miles to Port Moresby, where they were refueled in preparation for missions at dawn on the following day. However, it was necessary for them to reach Moresby by dusk, for otherwise there was inadequate time for the refueling necessary to comply with the Navy's request." 450
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