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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C reconnaissance planes had sighted the enemy's Moresby force only a few miles from the position first reported by the Y o r k t o ~ ' sscow; when this information was passed on to the carriers' attack groups, the latter altered their course slightly, then dive-bomber and torpedo planes went on to put their missiles on the Shoho, which they found approximately 2 0 miles northeast of Misima.61 Hit by dive bombers, the Shoho lost her steering gear; within a few minutes she had taken a number of torpedoes, capsized and sunk, carrying with her about 500 of her crew of 1 , 2 0 0 . ~ ~Next day the U.S. carrier pilots met the enemy's main support force, which had swept around to the south of San Cristobal, and in a major air engagement the dive bombers struck the Shokaku at least twice, damaging her severely, although the Zui- kaku managed to escape both bombs and torpedoe~.'~With the Shoho gone, the aviation fuel supply short on the Zuikaku, and knowing that U.S. cruiser strength was undamaged, the Japanese turned northward, for their main fleet was now in Japan after recently completing an operation against Ceylon."* Allied forces had lost the Lexington a t a time when that carrier could hardly be spared; also they had lost the oiler Neosho and the destroyer Sims, together with 66 planes. Tactically, it would seem that the task force barely had gained a draw, perhaps not even that, but strategically it had done much better; it had saved Port Moresby from a frontal assault. The Japanese now had one carrier less to use elsewhere, and the Shokaku would go to the repair yards rather than to Midway. The effects of this engagement would be demonstrated in the future. Meanwhile, the Japanese army prepared to restate its claim upon Moresby, except that now, with the sea road made impassable, it would try the overland trail south across Papua from Buna, planning to occupy Moresby by July."6 The Battle of the Coral Sea had involved forces both from the carriers and from AAF units based in Australia, but it was apparent at once that the contribution of the AAF had been of a limited nature; in fact, it is probable that its reconnaissance work was of greater im- portance than its tactical work in bombardment. Heavy and medium bombers had flown numerous armed reconnaissance missions from Townsville up to Port Moresby, and B- I 7's had attacked the Moresby transports on 7 May, repeating the attack on the 8th, although enemy reports indicate that they inflicted no damage in either case.66In addi- tion to participation in the engagement out over the Coral Sea, the 449
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