Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
received reports that the Japanese were occupying Florida Island
from their transports lying in Tulagi harbor, and he resolved to strike
a t once with his Yorktowm squadrons. At 0845 on the morning of the
4th, the attacks began upon Tulagi, and the enemy was surprised, los-
ing a t least one destroyer, several smaller craft, and suffering damage
on a minelayer, though the carrier’s pilots placed the losses somewhat
higher.57 But this represented only a minor sting, for the ultimate
enemy goal was Moresby, toward which the Japanese Admiral Hinoue
had dispatched an occupation force of approximately five transports
from Rabaul, plus a direct support force of four cruisers and the escort
carrier Shoho from B ~ i n . ~ ~Shoho’s planes were to defend the trans-
ports, but swinging down around the eastern side of the Solomons was
the Japanese navy’s Carrier Division Five, including Z u i k a h and
Shokaku, two of the navy’s newest; it would defend the entire Port
Moresby occupation force, attack the U.S. carriers which the Japanese
expected, and raid the Townsville area in an attempt to destroy Allied
aircraft and shipping there.
Out from Townsville and Moresby the B-25’s and B-I 7’s conducted
their searches, and on 4 May a B-25 of the 90th Bombardment Squad-
ron reported the sighting of a carrier and two heavy cruisers east of
Port Moresby.” The plane, driven off by a swarm of fighters, lost con-
tact. Next day another B-25 contacted a carrier south of Bougainville,
shadowing the vessel for an hour and five minutes while sending out
homing signals, hoping to guide B- I 7’s to the target.59At Townsville
the 435th’~B-17’s were reinforced by four planes from each of the
squadrons of the 19th Group, while a t Port Moresby 19 A-24 dive
bombers were put on stand-by ready to carry their 500-lb. bombs
against the enemy convoy coming down off Misima Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two Japanese forces were met by the US.carrier groups in the
first of the fleet air engagements which were to characterize nearly
all the Pacific naval actions. On the morning of the 7th, one of York-
town’s scouts reported the sighting of two heavy and two light
cruisers, but because the message was improperly coded, the combined
air attack force was launched from the two carriers in the belief that
two enemy carriers had been located. Meanwhile, the land-based
* Allied Air Forces daily reconnaissance reports for 4 and 5 May show sightings of
carriers with other heavy vessels on each of these days. The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.