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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E IN T H E PACIFIC
distance. One faction favored halting at the Shortland Island area, off
the southern end of Bougainville, while another advocated expanding
all the way down to the New Hebrides with the intention of severing
the South Pacific line of communications between the United States
and Australia. The final compromise of the local command settled
on taking the entire chain of the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive which might extend down the Solomons to New
Caledonia or Fiji, and though as yet there were few combat surface
units in the Rabaul area, by mid-April the Japanese were moving
forces into Palau and Truk, obviously preparing for a thrust to the
Anticipating that the operations would commence around 28
April, the US. Navy assumed that the enemy would attempt a sea-
borne invasion of the lower Solomons, or Port Moresby, or both. The
assumption was correct in both cases. Early in May an enemy force
moved down to Tulagi on Florida Island, lying directly across the
Sealark Channel from Guadalcanal, where the Japanese immediately
set about preparing a seaplane base for use in operations against New
Caledonia or Port Moresby. The primary goal now was Port Moresby,
whose capture apparently was regarded by the Japanese army as a
relatively simple operation and by the navy as necessary for the secur-
ity of R a b a ~ I . ~ ~Certainly Moresby was a key point, for if it was useful
to the Japanese, to the Allies it was the key to defense of northern
Australia and a point of departure for future offensive operations
against the Bismarck Archipelago. In preparation for the move against
Port Moresby, in May the enemy moved his Genzan Air Group with
twenty-seven planes and 300 flying personnel into Vunakanau at
Rabaul, and on eight of the twelve days preceding 7 May, Japanese
bombers carried out heavy air attacks on Port M o r e ~ b y . ~ ~
Rapidly, during the first week of May, Allied forces rushed to meet
the thrust. On I May two US.carrier task forces, built around the
Lexington and the Yorktown, rendezvoused 375 miles south of San
Cristobal Island, while at Townsville and up a t Port Moresby the
medium bombers of the 13th and 90th squadrons, A-24’s of the 8th
Squadron, and B-26’s of the z2d Group (M) were prepared for the
anticipated strikes. B-I 7’s of the 19th Bombardment Group’s 435th
Squadron, based at Townsville and staging through Moresby, scoured
the sea lanes leading down from Rabaul, flying all the way to Kavieng
on the ~ d . ~ ~On the evening of 3 May, Rear Adm. Frank J. Fletcher
447

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