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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
467 feet of clear deck and the last plane hung precariously out over
the stern ramp of the carrier; there was no spare space on the Hornet’s
flight deck.
Early on the morning of 18 April, the task force encountered the
first of the enemy’s line of pickets; by 0 7 38 a patrol vessel was sighted.
Now that secrecy had been compromised, and apprehensive that
enemy bombers would strike the surface force prior to the launch,
Halsey ordered the B-zs’s off at 0800, some ten hours prior to the
original plan, which had contemplated a late afternoon departure and
a night attack. Furthermore, the entire task force was one full day
ahead of the schedule originally sent out to the Chinese. And instead
of the 650 miles foreseen as a maximum distance to the targets, the
aircrews now faced approximately 800 statute miles of flight before
they would reach Tokyo.4z But this contingency had been foreseen
and it had been agreed that rather than endanger the carriers, the
planes would be sent off despite the remote chance that they could
reach China from such a distance. T h e crews entered their planes
amid some minor confusion caused b y the rush of last-minute prepara-
tions, and at 0818 local time Colonel Doolittle made his run down the
plunging deck into a 40-knot gale, which was sending green water
over the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it was carried off without a hitch. By 0 9 2 I the
sixteenth plane had taken off and was on its way toward Japan. After
launching the planes, the Hornet and the Eizterprise escaped without
interference, although a Japanese force of five carriers returning to
the homeland from Ceylon was alerted near Formosa and attempted
to intercept them.43
Although the patrol boat had warned of the approaching American
carriers, Japanese intelligence, not anticipating that the attack would
be made from such a distance, had not expected a raid before the
following day.44Thus the bombers were unopposed as they swept in
low over the coast on their way to Tokyo, where an air raid drill
was in progress. A full air raid alert was not effected until after the
attack was opened at I 2 I 5 b y Doolittle in the lead plane, who un-
loaded his incendiaries upon the Japanese capital. Almost at once he
was followed by Lt. Travis Hoover, attacking from 900 feet with
three 500-lb. demolition bombs, which, with the addition of a single
incendiary cluster, constituted the bomb load of the majority of the
Plane after plane roared over Tokyo, bombing and firing
441

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