Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E IN T H E PACIFIC
remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l l . ~ ~Gep-
era1 Arnold chose the leader of the expedition. H e was Lt. Col. James
H. Doolittle, and his 24 crews were selected from the 34th, 37th,
and 95th squadrons of the 17th Bombardment Group” and from the
89th Reconnaissance Squadron. All were volunteers, and there was
no effort to hand-pick the personnel; they represented average flight
crews of the AAF.
Execution of the plan would place a heavy burden upon the air-
craft. A cruising range of 2,400 miles with a 2,ooo-lb. bomb load
would be demanded of whatever plane was chosen, and after due
consideration for the merits of the B-26 and the B-25, the choice
fell upon North American’s B-25. At Eglin Air Depot auxiliary fuel
tanks were fitted into the planes, after removal of the lower turrets,
and when all additional capacity was filled, including an extra fifty
gallons carried internally in five-gallon tins and a collapsible 160-
gallon rubber bag in the crawlway, the planes carried 1,141 gallons,
of which the pilots could count on 1.100. T o lift this weight plus
the bomb load off the deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated training
program was instituted at Eglin Field, Florida, where the bombers
had arrived by I March, and where Lt. Henry F. Miller, USN, in-
structed the pilots in the technique of short take-offs. White lines
on the ground marked out the distances for the pilots, and before
concluding the training period, all of them had taken off twice
in a 700- to 75o-foot run with a plane loaded to 31,000 pounds;
they were confident that they could take off from a carrier in
their heavy planes. They were to leave behind their Norden bomb-
sights so ;hat they would not fall into enemy hands. In their place
Capt. C. R. Greening designed a simple substitute device which
he labeled the “Mark Twain,” and this was the bombsight car-
ried on the mission. For “protection” from astern, two wooden
.5o-cal. machine guns were installed in the extreme tip of the tail,
and, to record the flight, each plane carried either a still or a movie
camera.
Bombing training was conducted primarily from I ,500-foot alti-
tudes, with the planes approaching at minimum level, then making a
quick pull up to the desired level; but there was scarcely any time for
adequate gunnery practice. Nevertheless, on 24 March the detach-
* At that time assigned to the Eighth Air Force. See below, p. 614.
439

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.