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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E B A T T L E L I N E IN T H E PACIFIC
remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l l . ~ ~Gep-
era1 Arnold chose the leader of the expedition. H e was Lt. Col. James
H. Doolittle, and his 24 crews were selected from the 34th, 37th,
and 95th squadrons of the 17th Bombardment Group” and from the
89th Reconnaissance Squadron. All were volunteers, and there was
no effort to hand-pick the personnel; they represented average flight
crews of the AAF.
Execution of the plan would place a heavy burden upon the air-
craft. A cruising range of 2,400 miles with a 2,ooo-lb. bomb load
would be demanded of whatever plane was chosen, and after due
consideration for the merits of the B-26 and the B-25, the choice
fell upon North American’s B-25. At Eglin Air Depot auxiliary fuel
tanks were fitted into the planes, after removal of the lower turrets,
and when all additional capacity was filled, including an extra fifty
gallons carried internally in five-gallon tins and a collapsible 160-
gallon rubber bag in the crawlway, the planes carried 1,141 gallons,
of which the pilots could count on 1.100. T o lift this weight plus
the bomb load off the deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated training
program was instituted at Eglin Field, Florida, where the bombers
had arrived by I March, and where Lt. Henry F. Miller, USN, in-
structed the pilots in the technique of short take-offs. White lines
on the ground marked out the distances for the pilots, and before
concluding the training period, all of them had taken off twice
in a 700- to 75o-foot run with a plane loaded to 31,000 pounds;
they were confident that they could take off from a carrier in
their heavy planes. They were to leave behind their Norden bomb-
sights so ;hat they would not fall into enemy hands. In their place
Capt. C. R. Greening designed a simple substitute device which
he labeled the “Mark Twain,” and this was the bombsight car-
ried on the mission. For “protection” from astern, two wooden
.5o-cal. machine guns were installed in the extreme tip of the tail,
and, to record the flight, each plane carried either a still or a movie
camera.
Bombing training was conducted primarily from I ,500-foot alti-
tudes, with the planes approaching at minimum level, then making a
quick pull up to the desired level; but there was scarcely any time for
adequate gunnery practice. Nevertheless, on 24 March the detach-
* At that time assigned to the Eighth Air Force. See below, p. 614.
439

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