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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R T I sources; therefore, available aircraft, to be employed to the fullest advantage, should not be deprived of that freedom of movement which was regarded as one of the greatest assets of air power. Bind- ing air striking units to fixed assignments across the Pacific in an effort to maintain a point, or limited defense, such as the Navy de- sired, would nullify the high strategic mobility of these units; in this event they would be deprived of the power of decisive action which otherwise they might contribute through concerted operations. Cer- tainly such a policy, if applied in the Pacific with its multiplicity of bases, would become prohibitively costly in terms of national re- s o u r c e ~ . ~ ~The AAF spokesmen maintained that the ferry route con- stituted an extreme case of a defense area which was linear in type and of limited depth; in the assignment of air forces to such an area, sound strategic procedure dictated basing the major air striking ele- ments at the extremities of the line. Meanwhile, by the development of suitable intermediate bases and logistical services, it would be possible to provide for the rapid concentration of the air units against any threat which might develop along the undefended portions of the line.36The debate continued. The T o k y o Raid All these plans and debates were necessary preliminaries to action, but plans alone do not win wars, nor do they sustain morale, for by their very nature they can be known only to a small circle within the topmost level of the military organization. Yet there was dire need of a stimulus to morale during the first weeks following the attack upon Pearl Harbor, which had preceded by three days the further loss to the Allies of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse off Malaya. One such stimulus was conceived during the dark hours of January 1942, one which projected a strike at Tokyo from the sea. Apparently President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition, although it is not possible to determine its original author.s7 The scheme involved the launching of medium bombers from a U.S. air- craft carrier which would transport the planes to a point near enough to Japan to permit them to attack Tokyo and several of the larger industrial Japanese cities; from Japan the planes would proceed 1 , 2 0 0 miles farther across the East China Sea to airfields in eastern China, subject of course to the consent of the Chinese government. From this point they would refuel, then pass on to Chungking and so 438
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