Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C donia, the planners greatly exceeded their former estimates. For Fiji it was now proposed that the AAF base twenty-six medium bombers on Viti Levu and no less than fifty-five fighters, while New Cale- donia would carry the very considerable force of thirty-one medium bombers and eighty fighter aircraft.31 Even these substantial incre- ments appeared inadequate to some of the joint staff planners, who believed that a far heavier increase than that recommended was necessary to prevent an early collapse of the entire situation in the Pacific area.32 As the discussion progressed, it was apparent that the line of islands was not yet secured throughout its length, but in those cases where air strength was lacking it either was projected or en route. By 1 7 March, Fiji, Christmas, and New Caledonia had one squadron each of twenty-five fighter aircraft, and twenty-five additional fight- ers of the 68th Squadron were in Australia scheduled for movement to Tongatabu. Efate still lacked air strength, but twenty-one Marine fighters currently in Hawaii were scheduled to arrive at that island as soon as the landing field became operable, estimated between I and 1 5 June, and these were to be supplemented by a pursuit squadron with its necessary ground services, all of which were to come from By April, construction of the bases was well along and some meas- ure of protection had been provided for most of them, but it was questionable that any of them alone would be able to resist a de- termined and powerful Japanese attack. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that joint staff planners should summarize and inte- grate all previous studies concerning defense of the South Pacific. Specifically, they desired an assessment of the number of bombers of all types required to provide a mobile defense for all the island bases along the line of communications, the time required for con- centrations of a bomber force, the available landing fields, and the minimum fighter, ground, and antiaircraft facilities necessary for effective o p p o s i t i ~ n . ~ ~ It was quite apparent that the question of garrisoning the islands involved two conflicting theories." One doctrine, that of the Army Air Forces, emphasized the concept of mobility. General Arnold and the other AAF spokesmen were fully cognizant of the strain which the European and Pacific theaters were throwing upon AAF re- * A subject to be discussed at greater length in Vol. IV. 437
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.