The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L E L I N E I N T H E P A C I F I C
donia, the planners greatly exceeded their former estimates. For Fiji
it was now proposed that the AAF base twenty-six medium bombers
on Viti Levu and no less than fifty-five fighters, while New Cale-
donia would carry the very considerable force of thirty-one medium
bombers and eighty fighter aircraft.31 Even these substantial incre-
ments appeared inadequate to some of the joint staff planners, who
believed that a far heavier increase than that recommended was
necessary to prevent an early collapse of the entire situation in the
Pacific area.32
As the discussion progressed, it was apparent that the line of islands
was not yet secured throughout its length, but in those cases where
air strength was lacking it either was projected or en route. By
1 7 March, Fiji, Christmas, and New Caledonia had one squadron
each of twenty-five fighter aircraft, and twenty-five additional fight-
ers of the 68th Squadron were in Australia scheduled for movement
to Tongatabu. Efate still lacked air strength, but twenty-one Marine
fighters currently in Hawaii were scheduled to arrive at that island
as soon as the landing field became operable, estimated between I and
1 5 June, and these were to be supplemented by a pursuit squadron
with its necessary ground services, all of which were to come from
By April, construction of the bases was well along and some meas-
ure of protection had been provided for most of them, but it was
questionable that any of them alone would be able to resist a de-
termined and powerful Japanese attack. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff directed that joint staff planners should summarize and inte-
grate all previous studies concerning defense of the South Pacific.
Specifically, they desired an assessment of the number of bombers
of all types required to provide a mobile defense for all the island
bases along the line of communications, the time required for con-
centrations of a bomber force, the available landing fields, and the
minimum fighter, ground, and antiaircraft facilities necessary for
effective o p p o s i t i ~ n . ~ ~
It was quite apparent that the question of garrisoning the islands
involved two conflicting theories." One doctrine, that of the Army
Air Forces, emphasized the concept of mobility. General Arnold and
the other AAF spokesmen were fully cognizant of the strain which
the European and Pacific theaters were throwing upon AAF re-
* A subject to be discussed at greater length in Vol. IV.
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