Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance…
  • p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the European and the Pacific theaters. The history…
  • p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas schools, where combat experience of the…
  • p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of Advance during the war…
  • p. 45 …Trenchard, then com- mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by his advanced…
  • p. 46 …the Zone of Advance, the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
  • p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis of the American advance. Since…
  • p. 51 …among the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but the most advanced thought…
  • p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced ideas of the Army’s…
  • p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
  • p. 70 …to have been geared closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
  • p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“ But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
  • p. 76 …who might provide advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
  • p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
  • p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
  • p. 91 …the years immediately follow- ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
  • p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
  • p. 96 …mission of coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum- stances decidedly favorable to…
  • p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
  • p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training then being…
  • p. 119 …in the organization of their air forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
  • p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
  • p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
  • p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as an advance striking force…
  • p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
  • p. 129 …supply resulting from the speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
  • p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German forces had destroyed all effective…
  • p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
  • p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis- rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
  • p. 149 …the best flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of basic and advanced Responsibility…
  • p. 161 …miles to the That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri- can…
  • p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
  • p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere, protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
  • p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division of the General Staff…
  • p. 183 …T h e British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
  • p. 198 …so far advanced as those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring and summer…
  • p. 201 …32 The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked structural advance over the force…
  • p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico presented the most advanced stage…
  • p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter- mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
  • p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same area.51These moves had not advanced…
  • p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance notice…
  • p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group, whose pilots had received advanced training…
  • p. 246 …But as the day advanced the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed in…
  • p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the Americans advance notice of…
  • p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did not indicate whether the question of an…
  • p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi- tional landings along the Luzon…
  • p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
  • p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
  • p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether- lands East Indies…
  • p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu- tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
  • p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
  • p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two theories to account for the…
  • p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments, and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
  • p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of enemy craft. Next, there…
  • p. 338 …time proved less effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little good…
  • p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide advance warning…
  • p. 358 …Prospects for completing the work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor were…
  • p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging + See below, p. 493. 34'
  • p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general service troops arrived in the waters…
  • p. 403 …T e n enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task force into southern Greenland in…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate and large-scale preparations for an offensive against Germany.
It considered that since the prime strength of the United Nations lay
in naval and air categories, profitable strategy should contemplate
effective employment of these forces; ground forces should be thrown
against regions where Germany could not exert the full power of her
armies. Application of this policy obviously pointed to the Pacific as
the preferred area of operations. The Army, on the other hand, held
the opinion that such strategy might not accomplish the defeat of
Germany and that it would be necessary to challenge German armies
on the continent of Europe."
At the same time, there was general agreement between the services
that if Australia and New Zealand were to be supported the sea and
air communications which pass through the South Pacific must be
made secure. Australia and New Zealand were vital as bases for future
operations, and loss of either or both would vastly multiply the diffi-
culties of any future offensive against Japan." Samoa was recognized
as occupying an important linking position; it must be held, as must
the bases so rapidly reaching a state of completion on the smaller
islands along the way. In their conclusion the Joint Chiefs of Staff
squarely faced the problem which was destined to plague all future
discussion of air power for the Pacific: because of the shortage of
shipping and the current lack of large forces in various categories,
any strengthening of the deployment against Japan would be at the
expense of the effort which otherwise might be thrown against Ger-
many. It was concluded that the forces for offensive action in the
United Kingdom and those for defensive action in the Pacific should
be built up simultaneously.3o
With these hard facts before them, Army and Navy representatives
made their initial over-all recommendations for all the island bases
between Hawaii and Australia, and their suggested allocations went
well beyond those proposed by the Combined Chiefs back in January.
The strengths for Christmas and Canton remained the same, twenty-
five pursuit aircraft in each case; Palmyra would become completely
a naval responsibility, as would Borabora and as Samoa was in the
earlier plan. Tongatabu now was an AAF base for twenty-five pur-
suits, and Efate was similarly designated as a base for an AAF pursuit
squadron of equal strength." But in the case of Fiji and New Cale-
* See map, p. 429.
436

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.