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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im- mediate and large-scale preparations for an offensive against Germany. It considered that since the prime strength of the United Nations lay in naval and air categories, profitable strategy should contemplate effective employment of these forces; ground forces should be thrown against regions where Germany could not exert the full power of her armies. Application of this policy obviously pointed to the Pacific as the preferred area of operations. The Army, on the other hand, held the opinion that such strategy might not accomplish the defeat of Germany and that it would be necessary to challenge German armies on the continent of Europe." At the same time, there was general agreement between the services that if Australia and New Zealand were to be supported the sea and air communications which pass through the South Pacific must be made secure. Australia and New Zealand were vital as bases for future operations, and loss of either or both would vastly multiply the diffi- culties of any future offensive against Japan." Samoa was recognized as occupying an important linking position; it must be held, as must the bases so rapidly reaching a state of completion on the smaller islands along the way. In their conclusion the Joint Chiefs of Staff squarely faced the problem which was destined to plague all future discussion of air power for the Pacific: because of the shortage of shipping and the current lack of large forces in various categories, any strengthening of the deployment against Japan would be at the expense of the effort which otherwise might be thrown against Ger- many. It was concluded that the forces for offensive action in the United Kingdom and those for defensive action in the Pacific should be built up simultaneously.3o With these hard facts before them, Army and Navy representatives made their initial over-all recommendations for all the island bases between Hawaii and Australia, and their suggested allocations went well beyond those proposed by the Combined Chiefs back in January. The strengths for Christmas and Canton remained the same, twenty- five pursuit aircraft in each case; Palmyra would become completely a naval responsibility, as would Borabora and as Samoa was in the earlier plan. Tongatabu now was an AAF base for twenty-five pur- suits, and Efate was similarly designated as a base for an AAF pursuit squadron of equal strength." But in the case of Fiji and New Cale- * See map, p. 429. 436
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