The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
attack of 7 December, thereby weakening the defense of the ferry
line, there was some reluctance to send air units into the South Pacific
in the days immediately following Pearl Harbor. On 9 December the
Air Staff informed the War Department that in view of the present
international situation it could not consider favorably the project for
basing units at Christmas and Canton island^.^ One month later, opin-
ion had altered. It was currently believed that the Japanese were able
to assault New Caledonia or Fiji with at least one infantry division
supported by strong naval and air force^.^ Recognizing that the de-
fense of all the bases along the route depended ultimately upon their
support by naval and air forces, on I Z January the Combined Chiefs
of Staff approved a plan to garrison all the islands on the ferry route
leading down to Au~tralia.~Initially some difference of opinion per-
sisted as to the extent of AAF ability to commit air units to the islands.
But there was agreement that the United States should arrange for the
local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and
Borabora, and that New Zealand, assisted by U.S. forces and materiel,
should bear responsibility for local defense of the Fiji island^.^
The defense plan called for the dispatch to New Caledonia of one
pursuit squadron of twenty-five aircraft and one medium bombard-
ment squadron of thirteen planes, and although it failed to designate
which one of the Allies would provide the garrison, it was generally
assumed that the pursuit unit would come from the United States.
In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron,
the 68th, which was ready for embarking. The unit later was replaced
by the 67th, which sailed from New York on 23 January.' General
Arnold took issue with the plan to place AAF units on New Cale-
donia. H e had no squadrons available except at the expense of forces
in the ABDA area, nor did he regard the priority of New Caledonia
as outranking that of Fiji or Samoa. H e pointed out that his own
problem differed drastically from that facing General Marshall: the
Army possessed sufficient ground forces to permit simultaneous dis-
patch to Australia and Northern Ireland and Iceland, but there was
inadequate shipping to carry the troops, while the AAF, on the other
hand, simply lacked the units.' Believing that the British should pro-
vide the necessary aircraft for the New Caledonia air garrison and
that Australia should furnish the pilots, he urged that the former be
requested to meet this need, whereupon arrangements were made to
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